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ARTICLE
Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution:
A Case Study of the British and American
Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict
Daniel Schwarcz*
Much of insurance law and regulation is concerned with compensating consumers who
have been wrongly denied coverage. But policyholders nonetheless have relatively few realistic
options for challenging an insurers adverse coverage determination. Litigation is often too slow
and costly for those who have recently suffered significant financial loss. Meanwhile, the
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) options that do exist-such as the conciliation services that
insurance regulators offer or the existing variants of insurance arbitration-are generally either
ineffective or unavailable for most disputes. This Article proposes a new way forward by
looking to the United Kingdomfs innovative Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), which
operates parallel to the British financial services regulator and is devoted solely to resolving
consumer financial disputes. The comparative success of the FOS, the Article argues, is
attributable primanly to the ways in which it blends elements of the individual, uncoordinated
insurance ADR schemes that are used in the United States. As such, this Article concludes that
American lawmakers can significantly improve insurance compensation by strategically
rethinlang the institutional architecture ofinsurance dispute resolution. It also suggests that the
British FOS may offer a model for improving consumer dispute resolution in realms beyond
insurance.
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A vanishingly small percentage of disputes between consumers
and firms are resolved through litigation.' Unless these disputes carry
the prospect of punitive damages or can be aggregated through class
actions, they generally do not merit the time, expense, or effort
required for ordinary litigation.2 Over the last several decades, various
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs have evolved to help
fill this void.' Unfortunately, many of these ADR ventures raise their
own serious concerns. For instance, arbitration, the most familiar form
of consumer ADR, is often accused of inappropriately favoring repeat
players, precluding judicial remedies, and suppressing public
information." Meanwhile, other consumer ADR experiments, such as
state-sponsored complaint-conciliation programs, typically face
1. See generally No ACCESS TO LAW: ALTERNATIVES T THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 3-49 (Laura Nader ed., 1980).
2. See A. Brooke Overby, An Institutional Analysis of Consumer Law, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1219, 1277 (2001) (listing devices intended to provide consumers with
greater access to courts). Although firms frequently resolve consumer complaints
voluntarily, these resolutions are not negotiated in the "shadow of the law" unless the
consumer can credibly threaten some form of legal recourse. See Robert H. Mnookin &
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law- The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J.
950, 996-97 (1979). Instead, they are motivated by other considerations, such as firms'
reputational interests. See id. at 984; infra note 26 and accompanying text. However, these
interests can often create insufficient incentives to (1) resolve consumer disputes or (2) to
avoid those disputes in the first place. See inlra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
3. In the 1976 Pound Conference, Chief Justice Warren Burger called for the
development of ADR to improve individuals' access to law. See KATHERINE VW. STONE,
PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2-4 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 134 (2004); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come
Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADA 15 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 19, 38-57 (1999); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84
B.U. L. REv. 1, 30 (2004); Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping MandatoryArbitration: Is It Just, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1649 (2005); Jean R. Stemlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration
To Eliminate Consumer Class Actions Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable
Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 77-92 (2004). But see Samuel Estreicher, Satums
for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration
Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 559, 563 (2001) ("A properly designed
arbitration system ... can do a better job at delivering accessible justice for average claimants
than a litigation-based approach."); Peter B. Rutledge, WhitherArbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. PoL'Y 549 (2008) (criticizing the proponents of arbitration reform for advocating for
reform without adequate empirical evidence as to the net benefits); Stephen J. Ware, Paying
the Pn'ce of Process: Judicial Regulation of ConsumerArbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP.
RESOL. 89, 89-93 (calling attention to the pro-consumer side of arbitration agreements). For
an excellent review of the basic terrain of the consumer arbitration debate, see EDWARD
BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERCA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127-85 (2006). The
recently proposed Arbitration Fairness Act would limit the use of predispute, mandatory
arbitration provisions in consumer contracts. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th
Cong. (2007).
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resource constraints, low claims resolution rates, and their own set of
neutrality concerns.5
This Article examines a different, and relatively unfamiliar,
consumer dispute resolution scheme known as a "private
ombudsman." Unlike typical ombudsmen schemes, which help
resolve disputes between a private party and government entity, a
private ombudsman seeks to resolve disputes between two private
parties.6 Despite its name, it can be either a public or a private entity.
The private ombudsman model first developed as a joint undertaking
among three insurers in the United Kingdom It has since evolved
into the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), an independent
government entity whose sole function is to resolve British consumers'
disputes with their financial service providers.8
In many respects, the FOS's institutional design is unremarkable.
As with many American regulators, the FOS attempts to conciliate
resolutions of consumers' complaints with their financial services
providers.9 If such conciliation fails, then, as in American forms of
5. See David Serber, Resolution or Rhetoric: Managing Complaints in the
California Department of Insurance, in No ACCESS To LAW: ALTERNATIVES To THE AMERICAN
JUDICIAL SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 317, 339-40; Eric H. Steele, Fraud Dispute, and the
Consumer. Responding to Consumer Complaints, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1107, 1177-79, 1185
(1975); William C. Whitford & Spencer L. Kimball, Why Process Consumer Complaints? A
Case Study of the Office of the Commissioner ofInsurance of Wisconsin, 1974 Wis. L. REv
639, 669.
6. Compare RHODA JAMES, PRIVATE OMBUDSMEN AND PUBLIC LAW 3 (1997)
(defining a "private ombudsman" as an ombudsman who responds to consumers' complaints
about private firms, and who are not necessarily affiliated with those firms), with BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1121 (8th ed. 2004) (defining an ombudsman as "[a]n official appointed to
receive, investigate, and report on private citizens' complaints about the government").
Numerous American regulators have ordinary ombudsmen. Indeed, the proposed National
Insurance Act, which would create an optional federal charter for insurers, contains a
provision that would create just such an ombudsman. See Hal S. Scott, Optional Federal
Chartening of Insurance: Design of a Regulatory Stivcture (Harvard Pub. Law Working
Paper No. 07-05 & Networks Fin. Inst. Policy Brief No. 2007-PB-04, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-985579. The insurance ombudsman would act as a liaison between
the Office of National Insurance "and any person adversely affected by the Office's
supervisory or regulatory activities, including the failure of the Office to take a requested
action." National Insurance Act of 2006, S. 2509, 109th Cong. § 1107(b) (2006).
7. See JAMES supra note 6, at 3.
8. See Rhoda James & Philip Morris, The New Financial Ombudsman Service in
the United Kingdom: Has the Second Generation Got It Right?, in INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CONSUMERS' ACCESS TO JUSTICE 167, 172-76 (Charles E.E Rickett &
Thomas G.W Telfer eds., 2003).
9. Financial Services & Markets Act 2000, c. 8, § 225 (Eng.). See generally Peter
Tyldesley & Saira Paruk, The Financial Ombudsman Service and General Insurance
(Chartered Ins. Inst., Fact Files 2007). On the characterization of state regulators' and the
FOS's attempts to promote voluntary settlement as conciliation or evaluative mediation, see
infa notes 90 and 212.
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arbitration, the FOS can issue binding awards, compelling firms to pay
up to £100,000 (roughly $150,000) in compensation to consumers in a
single case.'0
Despite these parallels to American consumer ADR, the FOS
achieves extraordinary rates of voluntary settlement, covers a broad
array of disputes, and enjoys remarkable support among British
consumers, consumer groups, industry, and academics." Perhaps for
these reasons, the FOS has served as a model for reform in many
countries, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Ireland, India,
and Japan.'
2
This Article's central argument is that the FOS's comparative
success is primarily attributable to the ways in which it blends and
integrates reforms that have been used independently in the United
States. For instance, the FOS combines various ADR strategies-
including internal complaint handling by firms, state-provided
complaint conciliation, and arbitration-into a single coordinated
scheme. This institutional architecture allows more involved and
expensive ADR stages to have significant trickle down effects that
improve the efficacy of earlier, cheaper stages of the ADR process.
Similarly, the FOS's public, but nonregulatory, status blends private
arbitration with regulator-provided conciliation in a way that helps the
FOS effectively manage decision-maker bias. Finally, the FOS's
unique "reasonable fairness" standard blends formal doctrinal
precedent with informal industry norms and equitable principles in a
way that simultaneously promotes flexibility and consistency. These
explanations for the FOS's success motivate this Article's normative
claim that American jurisdictions could improve consumer dispute
10. Financial Services & Markets Act 2000, §§ 228-229; James & Morris, supra note
8, at 189.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See Rashmi Abichandani, Policyholder Interest Protection: Review of the
Insurance Ombudsman Scheme, 5 ICFAI J. INS. L. 45 (2007) (India); Geraint Howells &
Rhoda James, Litigation in the Consumer Interest, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 10 (2002)
("In ... Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK, the private ombudsman has proved to
be a popular consumer remedy with business, government, and broadly with consumer
interests."); Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, A Comparative Analysis of the Financial Ombudsman
Systems in the UK and Japan, 5 J. INT'L BANKING REG. 333 (2004) (Japan); Explanatory
Materials on the Establishment of the Japan Financial ADR/Ombudsman Study Group 13
(Apr. 18, 2007) (on file with author) (Japan); Financial Services Ombudsman's Bureau of
Ireland, About Us--Overview, http://www.firancialombudsman.ie/about-us/ (last visited
Nov. 16, 2008) (Ireland). Many other European countries also have ombudsman services that
resemble the FOS. For a Web site that details the financial ombudsman schemes of all
European countries, see Financial Dispute Resolution Network, Members of FIN-NET,
http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/fin-net/membersen.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
2009] 739
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resolution dramatically by adopting a more thoughtful institutional
architecture within which to deploy their ADR efforts. 3
This Article focuses on insurance disputes as a case study to
advance this argument for two reasons. First, dispute resolution is a
core concern of insurance law, as reflected by the FOS's genesis in the
insurance industry. Unlike any other financial service provider,
insurers' liabilities are contingent on events-such as fires, thefts,
health problems, and lawsuits-which are often difficult to specify
fully ex ante or to verify accurately ex post.' 4  Yet aggrieved
policyholders need compensation quickly while insurers have a natural
incentive and capacity to delay litigation as well as claims resolution
generally.'5 Second, and even more importantly, various consumer-
oriented insurance ADR programs already exist in the United States.
The insurance departments of individual states have developed
numerous insurance conciliation schemes, and states have experi-
mented with a number of rules and procedures for regulating private
insurance arbitration." These programs serve as a good starting point
for reform and a useful basis of comparison for analyzing the private
ombudsman model.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I explores the need to
modernize the American approach to resolving consumer insurance
disputes. Part II critically examines attempts by individual states to
promote the ADR of insurance disputes, arguing that these efforts have
had limited benefits for consumers. Part III describes the private
ombudsman approach, as implemented by the FOS, and compares it
13. This Article is thus consistent with the admonition of one prominent scholar that
"the public needs fewer categorical pronouncements and more contextual evaluation" of ADR
mechanisms. See Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform:
Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 476 (2004). The Article
can thus be framed within the Dispute System Design literature, which explores the
"systematic process of creating a dispute resolution system that harnesses the positive aspects
of conflict or at least minimizes the negative aspects." Susan Franck, Integmting Investment
Treat Conflict and Dispute System Design, 92 MINN. L. REv. 161, 177-80 (2007) (providing
an overview of this literature).
14. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DSTRBUTING RISK 174, 180-81 (1986); TOM BAKER,
INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 94-96 (2d ed. 2008); Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a
Multisectored Financial Services Industry An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319,
330-31 (1999); Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditions in
Order To Avoid Disproportionate Forfeiture; Claims-Made Formats as a Test Case, 5 CONN.
INS. L.J. 505, 578-88 (1999).
15. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of
Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1389, 1412-20 (2007); Alan 0. Sykes, "Bad
Faith"Breach of Contract by First-Party Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405,407 (1996).
16. See Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in Insurance Disputes: Inverse
Preemption ofthe FederalArbitration Act, 1I CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 264-92 (2005).
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with American ADR efforts in insurance. It claims that the FOS has
many of the same elements as American consumer insurance ADR, yet
is wildly more successful. Part IV-the intellectual heart of this
Article-offers several explanations for this seeming contradiction,
each of which focuses on the way that the FOS blends and coordinates
the individual ADR elements of American consumer insurance.
Finally, Part V analyzes some potential strategies for implementing an
FOS-type scheme in the United States and speculates about the extent
to which the FOS might serve as a model for consumer ADR reform in
domains beyond insurance.
I. INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES AND LITIGATION
All forms of consumer insurance raise a common dilemma.
Consumers purchase insurance to protect themselves against
significant financial risks. When those risks arise, consumers are
often desperately in need of money and ill-equipped to battle with their
insurer. Insurers, however, face an inevitable temptation to deny
claims aggressively in order to inflate their bottom line. Although the
long term reputational consequences of this strategy can be dire, the
long term is often long indeed: markets are slow to respond to
deficient claims handling given the inherent malleability of insurance
contract language, the impediments to full information in consumer
insurance markets, and the strategic disadvantages that policyholders
face in battling coverage decisions.
One of the primary ways that insurance law addresses this
problem is by expanding the remedies that are available to successful
plaintiffs in insurance coverage litigation. Unlike ordinary breach of
contract cases, aggrieved policyholders can receive attorneys' fees,
emotional distress damages, and even punitive damages.' 7 Despite this
expansive set of potential remedies, insurance litigation actually
provides a relatively poor source of compensation for most aggrieved
policyholders. The problem is not that the remedies available through
litigation are insufficient-indeed, some might argue that they are
excessive. Rather, the problem lies in the process of litigation, which
17. See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims
Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1423-26 (1994).
18. In particular, the availability of emotional distress damages in this context is
controversial. Compare id. at 1423 (arguing that insurance "compensation should be as
complete as courts can make it" and should therefore include attorney's fees and emotional
distress damages) with George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Cisis andModem Tort Law,
96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1546-47 (1987) (suggesting that emotional distress insurance is generally
undesirable for most consumers).
2009]
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is a poor mechanism for making any remedy available to aggrieved
policyholders.' 9 Whereas litigation is slow, costly, and unpredictable,
litigants in insurance coverage cases need compensation quickly, have
few resources (financial and emotional) to devote to litigation, and are
generally risk-averse.
This Part elaborates on these points. Subpart A first describes the
risk of opportunistic breach by insurers. Subpart B then critically
examines the ability of litigation to compensate wronged
policyholders. Taken together, this Part motivates the remainder of the
Article by demonstrating the need to construct ADR mechanisms that
compensate policyholders more effectively than litigation.
A. The Risk of Wrongful Coverge Denals
Scholars, policymakers, and judges have long recognized that
consumer insurance arrangements raise significant concerns about
improper claims handling. ° Unlike many contracts, insurance policies
are sequential and contingent: whereas the policyholder performs
routinely by paying premiums, the insurer performs by paying a claim
if, and only if, a loss occurs.2' Vulnerable parties in sequential and
contingent contracts can usually protect themselves by specifying
clearly the conditions upon which an obligor's performance is due.2
But such protection is difficult, if not impossible, in the insurance
context. Because insurance policies concern an entire universe of
potential risks, they necessarily incorporate abstract language that
leaves insurers with significant contractual discretion." These
structural features of insurance contracts create an inevitable
temptation for insurers to adopt overly aggressive claims handling
practices: every dollar that an insurer avoids paying in claims adds to
its bottom line.
In most cases, of course, insurers resist the temptation to
aggressively limit claims payments for business reasons. Insurers'
19. See Sykes, supra note 15, at 422 (arguing that improving the process for
compensating aggrieved policyholders may mitigate the capacity of insurers to exploit
litigation delay in order to extract favorable settlements).
20. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 14, at 179 (noting that the insurance dynamic
"create[s] special opportunities for inefficient breach").
21. See BAKER, supra note 14, at 94-96; Works, supra note 14, at 578-88.
22. See CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN
CONTRACT LAW 779 (5th ed. 2003).
23. See ABRAHAM, supra note 14, at 174 ("[I]nsurance policies often are not specific
enough to make the rights and obligations of the parties during the claims process crystal
clear?'); Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REv.
531, 547-50 (1996).
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capacity to sell insurance is premised on purchasers' willingness to
believe that, should they suffer a covered loss, their insurer will make
good on its promise.24 But such market forces are not always sufficient
to stem insurers' temptation to short-change policyholders. Indeed,
significant evidence suggests that prominent national insurers such as
Unum/Provident, State Farm, and Allstate have each recently engaged
in systematic, national efforts to wrongly cut claims payments to
policyholders."
One of the primary explanations for this pattern is that insurers'
reputations often do not accurately track the true quality of the claims
handling practices.26 Consumers' impressions of insurers are formed
primarily by advertising and word-of-mouth. 27  But insurance
advertising typically relies on abstract promises rather than concrete or
24. For a general discussion of the role of reputation in disciplining sellers'
contracting behavior, see Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffier, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring ContractualPerformance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
25. See JEFFREY W STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL V STATE
FARMINSUPANCE (2008) (State Farm); John H. Langbein, TrustLawasRegulatoryLaw: The
Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1315, 1317-21, 1339 (2007) (Unum/Provident); Consumer Watchdog, Consumer
Advocates Call for Refunds, Rate Reductions, for Allstate Policyholders After Company
Releases Internal Documents Revealing Intentionally Underpaid Customers (Apr. 7, 2008),
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/insurance/articles/?storyld=19621 (Allstate).
26. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1413-15. But cf Sykes, supra note 15, at 418
("[A]ny insurer who frequently refused to pay covered claims would likely soon develop a
reputation for behaving in this fashion and lose customers.").
27. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1413-15 (describing empirical evidence on how
consumers make their insurance purchasing decisions). One significant reason that people
rely on such information is that "[i]nformation about the reliability of different insurers is
hard to come by ... [and] the quality of insurance coverage is almost impossible to assess
without an expert." ABRAHAM, supra note 14, at 176. Although the Internet has improved
matters in recent years, information about the relative quality of insurers' claims handling is
still remarkably unavailable. See Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Proposal for Centralized Data
Collection, discussed in Sean P. Carr, NAIC Sets September Vote for Market Conduct Plan,
BESTWIRE, July 28, 2008, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool (search for
"BestWire" in "Find a Source"; then search for "NAIC Sets September Vote"); Chad
Hemenway, NCOIL Study Expanded To Address NAIC Market Conduct Plan, BESTWIRE,
July 11, 2008, available at http://www.lexisnexis.comlawschool (search for "BestWire" in
"Find a Source"; then search for "NCOIL Study Expanded"). One recent proposal to the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) would empower regulators to
collect and publicly disclose important data elements about the relative quality of insurers'
claims handling. Id. These include how often claims are settled within specified time
periods and the percentage of claims that are closed with, or without, payment during a policy
period. Id Unfortunately, insurers have bitterly resisted the proposal under the guise of
confidentiality and trade secret protection. Letter from Marty Mitchell, Dir., Prod. Policy,
America's Health Ins. Plan et al., to Sandy Praeger, President, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs
(June 18, 2008), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees-d-data-collection_
comments_comtrades_080618.pdf.
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verifiable information about insurers' relative reliability." Word-of-
mouth also has a limited capacity to transmit reliable information in
consumer insurance markets, because consumers typically never
experience the most important element of the coverage they
purchase-the protection it provides against low-probability, high-cost
losses.29 Even when consumers do experience a significant loss, they
are generally ill-equipped to judge whether their insurer acted
properly."
These problems are exacerbated by the fact that consumers
typically purchase insurance as part of a larger event or transaction,
such as taking a job or buying a home or automobile. Empirical
research has consistently found that individuals make market decisions
using heuristics that balance "the desire to achieve accuracy with the
desire to minimize effort."3 For this reason, "as decisions become
more complex, decision makers will tend to adopt simpler choice
strategies to cope with that complexity."32 Consumers who bundle
insurance decisions with other highly significant choices are
consequently likely to rely on disproportionately simple choice
strategies when making insurance decisions.33 This is particularly true
given the inherent complexity of the insurance decision-making14
process. In this environment, market forces may actually encourage
insurers to provide claims handling that is more aggressive than
consumers would purchase were they fully informed and rational.35
28. Baker, supra note 17, at 1403-07.
29. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1413-15.
30. SeeBaker, supra note 17, at 1407-13.
31. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1223-34, 1226 (2003) (reviewing literature).
32. See id at 1226.
33. While these choice strategies will clearly encompass factors such as price and the
types of coverage available, they will frequently not include such intangible criteria as the
quality of different insurers' claims handling practices.
34. Consumers' decision-making processes about insurance are a complicated mix of
intuitive, emotional, and rational responses that are susceptible to manipulation. See
generally HOwARD KUNREUTHER & MARK PAULY, INSURANCE DECISION-MAKING AND
MARKET BEHAVIOR (2006); PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 76-77 (2000); David M.
Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory To Meet the Practice of Insurance 5
(Apr. 2004), http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/cutler/files/cutler-zeckhauser-theory
_anCpractice of insurance.pdf.
35. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2004);
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.YU. L. REV, 630, 745-49 (1999). For empirical evidence of this
insurer-side adverse selection, see Baker, supra note 17, at 1400-16. For an argument linking
insurer-side adverse selection to the compensation of intermediaries, see Daniel Schwarcz,
Differential Compensation and the Race to the Bottom in Consumer Insurance Markets, 14
CONN. INS. L.J. (forthcoming 2009).
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Much of insurance law is designed to respond to these market
problems by deterring improper claims handling practices. First, all
states have adopted some version of the Model Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act (UCSPA), which authorizes state regulators to
take action in cases of flagrant or repeated unfair claims practices.36
Second, many states also rely on ex post, private regulation of claims
handling through litigation." Under the doctrine of bad faith,
policyholders are entitled to emotional distress damages and,
potentially, even punitive damages if an insurer negligently, knowingly,
or recklessly denies a claim without a reasonable basis to do so.3
Although these measures help to mitigate the risk that insurers
will adopt inefficiently aggressive claims-handling practices, they
hardly solve the underlying problem. In practice, most states' UCSPAs
have little impact on insurers' claims handling because the Act
employs vague standards,39 and most insurance regulators do not
devote significant resources to its enforcement. 40 Even when state
regulators do attempt to enforce their state's UCSPA, the sheer volume
36. See 2 OFFICIAL N.A.I.C. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT
(1980). See generally KATHLEEN HEALD ETTLINGER ET AL., STATE INSURANCE REGULATION
103 (1st ed. 1995).
37. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 15 (arguing that several doctrines of
insurance law, most notably the reasonable expectations doctrine, often constitute the judicial
regulation of insurance and that these doctrines have many parallels to products liability law).
38. See generally Symposium on the Law of Bad Faith in Contract and Insurance, 72
TEX. L. REv. 1203 (1994). The standard for defining bad faith differs by jurisdiction. See
BAKER, supranote 14, at 111-13.
39. This is not necessarily a defect of the model act, as the proper handling of a claim
depends on innumerable factors. Additionally, the UCSPA does admittedly have some clear
procedural requirements that states can, and do, monitor through complaint handling. See
ETTLINGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 90-97; JEFFREY STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE
CONTRACTS § 2.04 (3d ed. 2006).
40. ETTLINGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 103 ("Many claims people consider private
regulation to be the primary method to assure that claims activities are monitored and that
consumers are treated in good faith'"); see also Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos.,
758 P.2d 58, 77 (Cal. 1988) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (observing that since the California UCPA
was enacted in 1959, there has not been "a single case reported in which the Insurance
Commissioner has taken disciplinary action against a carrier for 'unfair and deceptive acts or
practices in the business of insurance' involving a claimant"). Given the limited resources of
most insurance departments, this balance is sensible. Unlike claims handling, many
insurance regulatory issues-such as insurers' solvency, pricing schemes, and forms-cannot
be remedied ex post. Faced with a choice, regulators ought to devote their scarce resources to
these problems. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 357, 364 (1984) (discussing the optimal combination of ex ante and ex post
regulation).
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of claims that insurers process makes regulating that activity
exceptionally difficult.
4
'
The doctrine of bad faith similarly faces significant limitations in
its capacity to mitigate the risk of improper claims-handling. Most
importantly, the doctrine is often unavailable to aggrieved
policyholders, as some states have not adopted the remedy and it is
preempted by ERISA in all states when the underlying insurance is
part of an employee benefit plan.4 ' Even when it is available, the
doctrine's deterrent force is undermined by the malleability of insurers'
coverage obligations, which blurs the distinction between merely
incorrect coverage denials and true bad faith.43 Additionally, bad-faith
causes of action do not protect consumers with legitimate grievances
who cannot credibly threaten to litigate the dispute." As a result of the
underwriting process, insurers are uniquely positioned to discriminate
between such policyholders and those who pose credible litigation
• 41
risks. Insurers may thereby be able to shortchange nonlitigious
policyholders without facing an effective deterrent threat from the
doctrine of bad faith.46
B Coverage Litigation and Compensation
One major function of insurance coverage litigation is to provide
a publicly funded route through which insurance policyholders who
41. Insurance regulators do target their market conduct exams to companies or
practices that data suggest are particularly problematic. See Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs,
Framework for Market Analysis, discussedathttp://www.naic.org/committees d_mapwg.htm.
42. See Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance
Transactions Alter Two Decades, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 1153, 1153-56 (1995) (cataloging which
states have bad-faith remedies and which do not); Langbein, supra note 25, at 1315, 1317-21,
1339 (arguing that ERISA's exclusive remedial scheme, which generally limits remedies to
the recovery of benefits, contributed to the unfair claims practices of the disability insurer
Unum/Provident). Without the prospect of owing more in litigation than they would have
owed had they paid the claim originally, insurers will not be adequately deterred from
denying claims in bad faith. See William S. Dodge, The Case for Pumive Damages in
Contracts, 48 DuKE L.J. 629, 698 (1999); Mark Gergen, A Cautionary Tale About
Contractual GoodFaith in Texas, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1235, 1251 (1994).
43. See Sykes, supranote 15, at 429-43.
44. See R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother, Keeper. The Inability of
an Informed Minority To Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 674-75
(1996) (describing how firms that can discriminate between informed and uninformed
consumers are not constrained by the former in their dealings with the latter).
45. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1407-09.
46. Alternatively, insurers may be able to safely adopt a deny-first, pay-later claims
strategy wherein they preliminarily deny uncertain claims, but then reverse course to the
extent that a policyholder "reveals" herself to be likely to litigate. Such a strategy would only
be sensible, however, if informed policyholders were sufficiently risk-averse that they would
generally accept a late settlement offer instead of pursuing punitive damages in litigation.
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have been denied coverage can seek payment of their claims.47  Like
tort law, insurance coverage law can therefore be conceptualized as a
form of publicly mandated and facilitated insurance. 4' This insurance
protects policyholders against the risk, described above, that one's
insurer will be overly aggressive in denying coverage relative to
consumers' preferences in ideal market conditions.49
Ironically, though, insurance coverage litigation typically proves
to be a poor insurance mechanism. It is slow, inaccessible, and
unpredictable. This point is hardly novel-scholars have long made
the same observation about tort laWs insurance function. °  But
because many of the criticisms of tort insurance focus on the
incompatibility of the litigation process with efficient insurance, they
are directly applicable to insurance coverage litigation." For instance,
47. Some law and economics scholars have argued that compensation-oriented goals
ought not to affect normative legal analysis in tort law because privately provided insurance is
cheaper than publicly provided insurance. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 267-69 (2004); W KIP Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS
LIAi3ILITY 170-72 (1991). Whatever the merits of this argument, it is inapplicable to
insurance coverage disputes because no insurer could feasibly provide insurance to cover the
risk that another insurer would inappropriately deny coverage. Although one could arguably
purchase such coverage from one's own insurer, this argument raises the same problem that
creates the underlying risk in the first place: insurance consumers have informational and
cognitive limitations that impede their capacity to assess insurers' promises to pay claims, and
certain market forces exacerbate these limitations. See supra Part I.A.
48. See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in
Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 517 (1984) ("[T]he tort system may be
viewed as a system of compulsory insurance, with terms of coverage determined largely by
the private choices that generate court decisions." (footnote omitted)). Professor Kenneth
Abraham has made a similar, though slightly distinct point. See ABRAHAM, supra note 14, at
205. He also suggests that certain doctrines of insurance law-in particular the doctrine of
bad faith-often provide the seemingly paradoxical protection of "insurance against the risk
of not being insured." Id. His argument, however, is that insurance law sometimes provides
insurance against the nonpecuniary consequences of a claims denial. Id. The point here is
broader: insurance law provides insurance against the pecuniary (as well as, on occasion,
nonpecuniary) risks of being denied coverage.
49. This insurance function resembles the insurance that state insolvency guarantee
funds provide to policyholders against the risk that their insurers will be financially unable to
pay their claims when they become due. See generally EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & TH-ERESE M.
VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 104-05 (9th ed. 2003) (describing
guarantee funds as publicly provided insurance).
50. See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 48, at 521; Jeffrey O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault
Beyond Auto Insurance. Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REV. 749, 827 (1973); Stephen D.
Sugarman, DoingAway with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 593-97 (1985).
51. Of course, some of the problems with "tort insurance" are specific to tort law and
have no analog in the insurance coverage context. For instance, some scholars argue that tort
law's inquiry into fault is inefficient because insurance should be available even to negligent
parties. See O'Connell, supra note 50, at 749. Whatever the merits of this argument in the
tort context, it does not translate into the insurance coverage context, where the underlying
risk is the wrongfu/denial of a claim.
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litigation is inherently slow, whereas accident victims need
compensation quickly and may not have the emotional stamina
necessary for litigation, having recently experienced an unexpected
loss.5 2 Similarly, the costs of litigation typically make it accessible only
to accident victims who can find an attorney willing to take the case
on a contingency-fee basis.53 Finally, the litigation process produces
highly variable and unpredictable damages, whereas accident victims
are typically risk-averse. 4
In fact, litigation may be a particularly unattractive option for
accident victims who seek compensation from their own insurer, as
compared to tort victims who seek compensation from defendants and
their liability insurers. First, litigants in insurance coverage cases
typically receive limited insurance payments prior to litigation.55 By
contrast, tort victims often receive first-party insurance payments
(payments made by their own insurer) independently of any litigation.
52. See O'Connell, supra note 50, at 827 (concluding that "the delay and expense of
ascertaining fault" often leads accident victims to choose not to litigate claims). Victims of
economic loss-whether they are suing their injurer or their insurer-tend to have much
higher discount rates than other litigants because they have immediate financial needs to pay
medical bills, fix cars, rebuild houses, and supplement lost income. Sugarman, supra note
50, at 593-94 (explaining that tort plaintiffs often settle cases for less than their full value due
to, among other things, "delay" and "urgent financial need").
53. See Jeffrey O'Connell, Statutory Authotization of Nonpayment of Noneconomic
Damages as Leverage for Prompt Payment of Economic Damages in Personal Injury Cases,
71 TENN. L. REv. 191, 192 (2003) (explaining that because of the costs and prolonged nature
of tort liability litigation, most plaintiff's lawyers paid on a contingency fee basis "probably
will not take a case unless they are confident it is likely to lead to at least some substantial
payment"). Similarly, accident victims are generally unable to hire legal counsel at an hourly
rate because they do not have reserves of funds that can be directed towards legal fees.
54. See O'Connell, supra note 50, at 751 (discussing a 1970 study showing that
"[a]bout half of those seriously injured in traffic accidents get nothing at all from tort liability
claims"); Sugarman, supra note 50, at 594 ("Tort compensates in an arbitrary, perhaps
whimsical, way.... [L]awyers' talents, plaintiffs' demeanor, defendants' grit, and the
idiosyncrasies of jury composition combine to hand similar victims altogether dissimilar
results."). Whether accident victims are truly risk-averse may depend on whether they view
litigation awards to be gains or to be ways of mitigating losses. According to prospect theory,
people tend to be risk-averse when they frame payoffs as gains, but risk-seeking when they
frame them as losses. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory
An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979). But under the
more classical expected utility model, accident victims should be quite risk-averse because
the initial dollars they receive will be disproportionately valuable. See David Rosenberg,
Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future
Loss, 88 VA. L. REv. 1871, 1882 (2002).
55. Interestingly, a new insurance product eases this problem for businesses,
providing up to $250,000 to pay attorneys' fees for another insurers' denial of coverage. See
Susanne Sclafane, New Product Covers Legal Costs If Buyers Decide To Challenge Claim
Denial (July 7, 2008), http://www.propertyandcasualtyinsurancenews.com/cms/NUPC
/Weekly/o20lssue&/lssues/2008/26/News/P26CLAIMSDISPUTE.
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They are therefore comparatively well equipped to manage delays in
litigation awards. Second, because insurance coverage suits are not
usually initiated until after the claims process has stalled, there is often
a significant delay between an insured's need for cash and the initiation
of coverage litigation. In tort cases, no such gap exists between the
time of injury and the initiation of litigation. Third, plaintiffs in
insurance coverage cases are more likely to be risk-averse than tort
victims: all such litigants purchased insurance before their loss,
whereas only some tort victims were sufficiently risk-averse to
purchase first-party insurance. 6 Finally, the class action mechanism,
which helps to fund litigation challenging individually small financial
disputes, holds limited promise in the insurance coverage context, as
common issues do not often predominate in such cases."
Because litigation is so undesirable for aggrieved policyholders,
insurers generally hold an upper hand in settlement negotiations.
Insurers' bargaining advantage can lead them to reject fair settlement
offers.58 It can also cause insurers to delay the litigation process
artificially to strengthen this strategic advantage. Such delay may
enhance insurers' profits for totally unrelated reasons: investing the
"float" on insurance premiums is one of the primary ways that insurers
make a profit. 9 Although most states attempt to counteract this
benefit by permitting plaintiffs to recover prejudgment interest,60 this
offset will not be reflected in settlements if the plaintiff cannot credibly
threaten to see the case to trial. Nor could these problems be remedied
easily by allowing claimants to sell their insurance coverage claims to
third-party firms, because information problems such as adverse
56. At least two objections can be made to this point. First, many purchase insurance
because it is required by state law or by their lender. But the bare bones insurance that is
required in these contexts is less likely to result in coverage litigation because less is at stake
for policyholders in such cases. Second, some who do not purchase insurance simply may
not be able to afford it. This, however, likely reflects less risk aversion in many cases: these
individuals will tend to value insurance less because they have fewer assets to lose (health
insurance may be an exception).
57. Most insurance-related class actions concern nonclaims issues, such as the
calculation of premiums or the selling of policies. See Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The
Tradeoffs Between Regulation and Litigation: Evidence from Insurance Class Actions, I J.
TORT L. iss. 3, art. 2, at 17 (2007), http://bepress.com/jtl/vol l/iss3/art2 (collecting instances of
insurance class actions in recent years). There are exceptions, like the nonoriginal equipment
manufacturer parts class action. See id
58. SeeSykes, supranote 15, at 415.
59. See Richard E. Stewart & Barbara D. Stewart, The Loss of the Certainty Effec4 4
RISK MGMT. & INs. REv. 29, 32 (2001).
60. See Sykes, supra note 15, at 409, 413.
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selection and moral hazard would plague any such market.6 Taken
together, these factors may explain why it is in insurance coverage
cases where one tends to find the most vivid "references to insureds
who lose their homes because a claim is denied, who are unable to
secure needed medical care, [or] even to a disabled fellow whose
'wheelchair was repossessed."'62
II. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IN THE UNITED STATES FOR
RESOLVING CONSUMER INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES
Over the last century, state lawmakers have developed a
patchwork of approaches to improving policyholders' capacity to
challenge insurers' claims decisions. Perhaps the most frequently
overlooked example is the distinctive brand of conciliation that state
regulators use to help resolve disputes between consumers and
insurers.63 States have also experimented with different types of
arbitration schemes in consumer insurance, where federal law favoring
arbitration is "inversely preempted" by state insurance law under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.64 This Part critically describes these two
ADR approaches.
A. State-Sponsored Conciliation of Insurance Coverage Disputes
1. An Overview
Every state insurance department provides a mechanism by
which aggrieved policyholders can lodge complaints about their
insurers. In 2007, the consumer services departments of state
insurance regulators "investigated" and "resolved to [their]
61. But see id at 421-22 (suggesting that assignment of claims could improve
insurance markets). The adverse-selection problem stems from the fact that insureds may
have much better information than third-party firms about various coverage-related factors,
such as the precautions they took and the statements they made to insurers. Id The moral-
hazard problem stems from the fact that once a claim was sold, the insured would have little
monetary incentive to participate in future litigation. Id.
62. Id at 414-15.
63. Modem commentators seem to have implicitly dismissed the importance of
regulator-sponsored conciliation, as this process has received little attention in modem-day
insurance law scholarship. But cf Serber, supra note 5; Whitford & Kimball, supra note 5.
64. See Randall, supra note 16, at 264-92.
65. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) provides links to
each state's Web site description of how to file a complaint about an insurer. See Nat'l Ass'n
of Ins. Comm'rs, Consumer Information Source, https://eapps.naic.org/cis/ (last visited Nov.
27, 2008). Virtually all states allow consumers to complain electronically, over the phone, or
through ordinary mail. See id.
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satisfaction" over 222,000 consumer complaints.66 This figure
represents a small fraction of the overall consumer contacts with state
insurance departments, most of which are treated as "inquiries" rather
than "complaints."67 Of the roughly 222,000 consumer complaints,
approximately 126,000 were deemed "confirmed" under standards
developed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC).68 Consumers complain about a variety of coverage types-
with Health/Accident, Auto, and Homeowners consistently leading the
list.69 Complaints usually concern insurers' claim handling practices.
70
Regulators generally encourage aggrieved consumers to
complain directly to their insurer before contacting the state insurance
department.7' However, few departments appear to turn away
complainants who fail to lodge such internal complaints.72 Insurers are
required to maintain their own internal "complaint handling
66. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, NAIC Cites Top Insurance
Complaints for 2007 (Jan. 30, 2008), http://www.naic.org/Releases/2008_docs/2007_
complaints.htm.
67. In 2006, for instance, regulators received approximately 400,000 complaints and
approximately 2.5 million consumer inquiries. NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, STATE
INSURANCE REGULATORS' RESOURCE MANUAL 11 (2006) [hereinafter RESOURCE MANUAL].
The estimate of complaints in the text may also underestimate the number of complaints as
state reporting to the NAIC database is voluntary and only includes closed, confirmed
complaints. See NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, REASONS WHY CLOSED CONFIRMED
CONSUMER COMPLAINTS WERE REPORTED AS OF SEPTEMBER 22, 2008, at 1 (2008) (on file
with author) [hereinafter REASONS WHY]. States undoubtedly differ about when a consumer
complaint is "closed." Moreover, some jurisdictions do not even process some consumer
complaints. See Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, NAIC Consumer Services Survey 24, 36
(Sept. 2008) (presentation slides) (on file with author) [hereinafter Consumer Services
Survey].
68. REASONS WHY, supra note 67, at 1 (defining "closed" claims and "confirmed"
claims). For a definition of "confirmed," see infra note 97 and accompanying text.
69. NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, CLOSED CONSUMER COMPLAINTS BY COVERAGE
TYPE 1 (2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter COMPLAINTS BY COVERAGE TYPE].
70. REASONS WHY, supra note 67, at 1. In 2007, 58% of closed, confirmed consumer
complaints involved claims handling, as opposed to "underwriting" or "policyholder service."
Id Of these complaints, 20% concerned delayed claims, 18% concerned denied claims, 14%
concerned unsatisfactory settlement offers, and 6% concerned some "other" claims-handling
problem. Id
71. See, e.g., California Department of Insurance's File a Complaint Page,
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/contact-us/0200-file-complaint/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 16,
2008) ("Before you file a complaint with the California Department of Insurance, you should
first contact the insurance company, agent or broker in an effort to resolve the issue(s).");
Virginia Bureau of Insurance's File a Complaint Page, http://www.scc.virginia.gov/division/
boi/webpages/boifilecomplaint.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) ("The BOI encourages
consumers to try and resolve any problem with their company or agent before contacting the
Consumer Services Section.").
72. See sources cited supra note 71.
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procedures" under each state's UCSPA. 3 Outside of the health care
context, however, most states do not specify the details of this
requirement . Those that do require only that insurers compile basic
data about internal complaints, such as their type, the underlying line
of insurance, and the company's ultimate disposition.75 In most states,
only witten expressions of a grievance trigger insurers' internal
complaint handling obligations.76
Most states adhere to a similar protocol for processing consumer
complaints that reach their offices. When a consumer contacts the
department, a regulator first determines (1) whether the contact is a
complaint or merely an "inquiry,"" and (2) whether the department has
jurisdiction. 9 If both of these initial hurdles are cleared, the regulator
will then investigate complaints that seem potentially legitimate."s In
some states, the regulator who initially interacts with the consumer
investigates the complaint, whereas in others the complaint is assigned
to a designated complaint handler." The investigation begins with the
complaint investigator forwarding the consumer's complaint to the
insurer and asking for a response.82 An insurer's response may (but
73. See 2 OFFICAL N.A.I.C. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES AcT,
supra note 36.
74. The internal complaint rules that govern in the health insurance context are
discussed mhia text accompanying notes 130-143.
75. See Unfair Trade Practices: Model Regulation for Complaint Records To Be
Maintained Pursuant to the NAIC Unfair Trade Practices Act, in 5 NAIC MODEL LAWS,
REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 884-1 (2007).
76. See 2 OFFICIAL N.A.I.C. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES AcT,
supra note 36.
77. Interestingly, the current process for resolving complaints is not terribly different
than that described by Whitford and Kimball over thirty years ago. SeeWhitford & Kimball,
supra note 5, at 661-67.
78. Although definitions of a "complaint" differ by state, complaints generally
include "any communication that expresses dissatisfaction with a specific insurance company
or agent." See NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, REPORT OF THE NAIC COMPLAINTS HANDLING
AND REPORTING STANDARDS SUBGROUP, http://www.naic.org/committees d-complaints.htm
(last visited Jan. 6, 2009) [hereinafter REPORT OF SUBGROUP].
79. Jurisdiction may be limited if the complaint does not concern an insurance
product, is governed by another state's laws, or is preempted by federal law. See ErrLNGER
ET AL., supra note 36.
80. See NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, CONSUMER COMPLAINT WHITE PAPER 6
(2000) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. Thirty-five out of forty states report that their consumer
services staff spends at least sixty percent of its time on investigating complaints. Consumer
Services Survey, supra note 67, at 9. Complaints that seem to be clearly illegitimate are often
coded as inquiries rather than complaints. Id.
81. See Consumer Services Survey, supra note 67, at 32.
82. Id at 29-31; WHITE PAPER, supra note 80, at 7. Some states are moving to an
electronic complaint conciliation program. This system operates similarly to the conventional
process, but allows for electronic recording of complaints, which individual insurers can then
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need not) be informed by any earlier response it gave directly to the
consumer. Because complaint handlers have a limited capacity to
investigate or assess cases-they typically handle between 400 and
600 complaints a year8-they rely heavily on the insurer's response to
the complaint. When the complaint appears to raise a broad regulatory
issue, it is typically referred to a separate market conduct division of
the department. This happens very rarely, however: in 2007,
complaint handlers referred only 0.4% of complaints to their market
conduct divisions.
84
Insurance regulators process consumers' complaints for a variety
of purposes, including identifying potential regulatory infractions85 and
86publicly disclosing complaint data to help inform consumers. But the
most significant goal of regulators in processing complaints is to help
consumers resolve legitimate disputes with their carriers.87 Regulators
who perform this dispute resolution role generally have no authority to
require insurers to settle a claim.88 In fact, only a small handful of
states even require by statute that state insurance departments provide
this ADR service to complaining consumers.89
respond to online. See, e.g., Colorado Div. of Ins., Online Complaint Verification, Bulletin
No. B- 1.13, available at http://www.dora.state.co.us/insurance/regsbulletin.htm (select "B-
1.13") (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
83. Consumer Services Survey, supra note 67, at 15.
84. See NAT'L ASS'NS OF INS. COMM'Rs, DISPOSmONs REGARDING CLOSED
CONFIRMED CONSUMER COMPLAINTS 1 (2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter COMPLAINT
DISPOSITIONS].
85. The Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act erects procedural requirements that
insurers must follow in processing a claim and that regulators can monitor through
complaints. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
86. Different states disclose this information to varying degrees and using varying
formats. See generallyREPORT OF SUBGROUP, supra note 78.
87. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 80, at 4 ("State insurance departments should
provide an avenue for resolution of all consumer complaints."); id at 8 ("Even if there is no
apparent violation of any statute or regulation, it should be the complaint analyst's goal to
assist the consumer in resolving the situation."); see also Consumer Services Survey, supra
note 67, at 23 (reporting that almost half of departments view the primary purpose of the
consumer services division to be "assist[ing] consumers [in a] time of crisis" rather than
"investigat[ing] ... violations of law"); Consumer Services Survey, supra note 67, at 51
(reporting that in a survey of which training programs would be of value to individual
departments' consumer services staff, the most common answer, selected by thirty-one of
forty responding jurisdictions, was training for "conflict resolution skills").
88. E-vrLINGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 103 ("Although many insurance departments
have consumer sections available to answer consumers' questions and review claims
complaints, the insurance departments are usually not expected to make decisions to resolve
the complaints.").
89. But see, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 12921.1(a)(5)(B), 12921.1(f)(6), 12921.4(a)
(Deering 2005) (describing a scheme for "complaint mediation [and] investigation," which
does not "give the commissioner power to adjudicate claims" but suggests that Department
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Although state regulators use varying approaches in attempting to
resolve consumer complaints, the overall process is most aptly
described as conciliation or evaluative mediation.90 In the case of
seemingly nonmeritorious complaints, the conciliation process is fairly
straightforward. The regulator contacts the consumer and attempts to
explain why the insurer's actions appear warranted.'
By contrast, consumer complaints that appear legitimate result in
a much more fluid and varied conciliation process, with the regulator
pressing the insurer, directly or indirectly, to resolve the matter. Often
the complaint investigator simply "discusses" the merits of the
complaint with a representative of the insurer in an attempt to extract
concessions for the consumer.92  In Pennsylvania, complaint
investigators facing disputes about policy language may ask the insurer
whether there have been earlier instances when that insurer interpreted
employees ought to facilitate "insurer compromise, or other remed[ies] for the complainant");
IND. CODE ANN. § 27-4-1-5.6 (LexisNexis 1999) (authorizing commissioner to evaluate
consumer complaints and to mediate settlements in appropriate cases); N.J. STAT ANN.
§ 17:29B-18(b)(2) (West Supp. 2008) ("[T]he Commissioner of Banking and Insurance ...
shall investigate an insurer" upon receiving a consumer complaint and may "order the insurer
to make restitution to the aggrieved person.").
90. There is a large academic debate about how mediation should be conducted and,
in particular, whether or not it should be evaluative. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute
Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1887 (1997) (describing the "heated debate" among
dispute professionals concerning "the question whether mediation is facilitative or evaluative
or both"). Compare Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 945-46 (1997) (arguing against evaluative mediation),
with Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Meiators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques:
A Grid for the Perplexed 1 HARV. NEGcr. L. REV. 7, 23-24 (1996) (suggesting that evaluative
mediation can be acceptable), with Jeffrey W Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic.
Liberating ADR from Ideology, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 247, 247-48 (arguing that good
mediation is both evaluative and facilitative). In order to sidestep this generalized debate, this
Article uses the term "conciliation," which overlaps significantly with evaluative mediation in
that it involves a neutral third party attempting to bring two parties to a mutually satisfactory
settlement, in part by offering an independent evaluation of the underlying dispute. See
generally Loukas A. Mistelis, ADR in England and Wales, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 167, 205
(2001) (noting the similarities between conciliation and evaluative mediation). In their study
three decades ago, Whitford and Kimball similarly found that "the best characterization of the
[Wisconsin Insurance] Office's role in its routine complaint processing was as a mediator,"
though, in other cases, "[a] limited adjudicative label best characterizes the Office's dispute
settling role." Whitford & Kimball, supra note 5, at 681. The NAIC has characterized the
process as mediation. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 80, at 16 (stating that consumer
assistance can be provided by "the complaint analyst... assum[ing] the role of a mediator").
91. WHITE PAPER, supra note 80, at 8-10.
92. Consumer Services Survey, supra note 67, at 31. Ideally, complainants receive
periodic updates from the complaint handler as the investigation proceeds. SeeWHITE PAPER,
supra note 80, at 7.
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the relevant clause differently." Where there is tension between an
adjuster and a policyholder, the Pennsylvania Department will often
propose that a different adjuster be assigned to review the case afresh.94
States may also attempt to encourage settlements in other ways. For
instance, Minnesota generally does not include complaints that are
resolved within three days in the tallies of complaints that it reports to
the public.95 In general, though, states are careful not to do anything in
the conciliation process that could be construed as a "regulatory
decision" which might be appealable to the courts.96
2. Evaluating the Success of State Conciliation Programs
Although state-sponsored insurance conciliation is a valuable
resource for consumers, it suffers from three interrelated limitations: it
is frequently unsuccessful at convincing insurers to compromise, state
insurance departments often have inadequate resources to review
claims meaningfully, and review may tend to be biased in favor of
insurers.
The first of these limitations is the most significant. Regulatory
complaint handlers are often unable to resolve complaints in which the
state insurance department "upheld the consumer's complaint
position" under NAIC standards.97  In fact, according to states'
complaint data, regulators do not convince insurers to alter their
original position in the majority of cases where consumer complaints
are "confirmed."98  Importantly, this data is merely suggestive, as
93. See Interview with Ronald Gallagher, Deputy Ins. Comm'r for Consumer &
Producer Servs., Pa. Ins. Dep't (Mar. 30, 2008).
94. See id.
95. See Interview with Robert Commodore, Dir. of Mkt. Assurance, Minn. Dep't of
Commerce (Dec. 12, 2007).
96. See Interview with Ronald Gallagher, supa note 93.
97. See REASONS WHY, supra note 67, at 1. Under NAIC standards, consumer
complaints are "confirmed" if the regulator codes the complaint with a "disposition code"
that is not on the following list: "(1)Unable to assist; (2)Cancellation Upheld;
(3) Nonrenewal Upheld; (4) No Action Requested/Required; (5) Referred to Proper
Agency/Section; (6) Company In Compliance; (7) Company Position Upheld; (8) No
Jurisdiction; or (9) Insufficient Information." Id A new proposal would require regulators to
directly determine whether the complaint was confirmed, rather than making an inference
about the complaint based on the above scheme. See Bob Lisson & Jack Chaskey, Project
Summary: Complaint Handling and Reporting Standards (July 29, 2008) (on file with
author) (reporting that the Market Analysis Priorities (D) Working Group had adopted a
consensus definition of "confirmed complaint").
98. In 2007, there were approximately 68,000 confirmed complaints where
departments reported that they "Advised Complainant," the complainant "Entered into
Arbitration/Mediation" or "Filed Suit/Retained Attorney," "Information [was]
Furnished/Expanded," the complaint involved a legal or factual issue, or they were otherwise
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regulators have widely acknowledged that the underlying data
elements are overlapping, confusing, and ambiguous.9  Nonetheless,
the data strongly suggests that regulators are often quite limited in their
capacity to convince insurers to compromise on seemingly legitimate
consumer complaints. Interestingly, state-sponsored mediation
programs that departments coordinate after a natural disaster'00 enjoy
much better rates of claim resolution.'0'
A second, and likely related, limitation of regulator conciliation is
that the consumer affairs divisions of many state insurance
departments are significantly resource-constrained,' 2 resulting in vast
differences among the states regarding "the extent of services
"Unable to Assist." See COMPLAINT DISPOSITIONS, supa note 84, at 1. These figures do not
even include complaints where regulators report only that they were "Unable to Assist,"
because such complaints are not deemed to be "confirmed." By contrast, there were
approximately 62,000 instances in which departments reported a "Compromised
Settlement/Resolution' "Additional Payment;' "Coverage Extended," "Claim Reopened,"
"Claim Settled," "Delay Resolved," "Cancellation Notice Withdrawn" "Nonrenewal Notice
Rescinded," "Nonforfeiture Problem Resolved," "Deductible Refunded," "Endorsement
Processed," "Policy Issued/Restored," "Refund," "Premium Problem Resolved," "Rating
Problem Resolved," or a "Recovery." See id Whitford and Kimball also suggested that
regulators had difficulty convincing insurers to change their positions through mediation.
Whitford & Kimball, supm note 5, at 665 (finding that if the insurer did not voluntarily
change its position after receiving a copy of the consumer's complaint, then "[t]he
investigator almost always concluded solely on the basis of the complaint and the initial reply
[from the insurer] that the complaint was without merit or that factual or legal issues underlay
the dispute the Office could not or should not resolve").
99. Currently the Market Analysis and Priorities Working Group of the NAIC is
working to develop better codes for the entire complaint data collection effort. See Nat'l
Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Market Regulation and Consumer Affairs (D) Committee,
http://www.naic.org/committeesd.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
100. These programs are typically conducted by external organizations with which the
department has a standing agreement. Elizabeth Baker Murrill, Mass Disaster Mediation:
Innovative ADR, or a Lion's Den 7 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 401, 404-05 (2007). Some
insurance departments have also experimented with external mediation in disputes that do not
involve catastrophes. See Okla. Ins. Dep't, EAGLE Mediation, http://www.ok.gov/oid/
consumers/EAGLEMediation/index.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) (describing the
Oklahoma Insurance Department's EAGLE Mediation program, which assists consumers
whose complaints the department could not resolve because of a disputed question of fact).
101. The first such program in Florida handled around 2400 disputes and achieved a
settlement rate of ninety-two percent, leading the Florida department to label the program "a
resounding success." Murrill, supra note 100, at 404-05. Since then, several other states have
adopted similar catastrophe-based insurance mediation programs, which also appear to
resolve a high percentage of claims. Id As Murrill noted, this success is partially offset by
the prospect that such mediations may present significant risks for uninformed consumers.
See id at 402.
102. EiTLINGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 103 ("Insurance departments ... are not
equipped to deal with the volumes of consumers' claims complaints that are generated
daily.").
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provided" in attempting to resolve consumer complaints. °3 In fifteen
of forty states that responded to an NAIC survey, complaint handlers
have caseloads of 600 or more complaints a year, and in seven of those
states complaint handlers have caseloads of over 1000 complaints a
year.'34 Such caseloads obviously limit the extent to which a complaint
handler can carefully scrutinize a consumer's complaint or an insurer's
response. In some cases, they also lead to consumer complaints
simply being ignored. Indeed, forty-five percent of states responding
to the NAIC survey reported that they do not process all consumer
complaints that they receive."' One 1998 investigation found that, due
to resource constraints, the Indiana Department of Insurance "rarely
does anything in response" to consumer complaints. 10 6  As the
insurance commissioner at the time explained, "without a significant
increase in staff, many complaints 'can't get the attention they
deserve." 107
One common way that departments adjust their complaint
handling role due to resource constraints is to artificially, and
confusingly, limit the types of complaints that they handle. For
instance, many departments state that they will not attempt to resolve
complaints involving "legal or factual issues." In 2007, complaint
handlers turned away approximately fifteen to twenty percent of
consumer complaints on that basis."0  Many other consumers
presumably did not seek assistance from their regulator precisely
because they already knew of this limitation, which is often
prominently announced on department Web sites.' 09  Some
departments justify this limited role on grounds of a lack of authority,
as opposed to resource constraints. The view of these departments is
103. WHITE PAPER, supra note 80, at 28 ("[lt is clear [that] differences exist between
states regarding, among other things, the extent of services provided and the procedures
relating to the investigation and resolution of consumer complaints.").
104. Consumer Services Survey, supra note 67, at 15. By contrast, fourteen of those
states reported that complaint handlers enjoyed caseloads of fewer than 400 cases a year. Id.
105. Id. at 24.
106. See Scot J. Paltrow, A Matter of Policy: How a State Becomes Popular with
Insurers-But Not Consumers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1998, at Al.
107. See id. Even when complaints were attended to, the consumer consultants on the
staff did "little more than forward complaints to the companies." Id.
108. See COMPLAINT DISPOSmONS, supra note 84, at 1-2.
109. See, e.g., California Department of Insurance's File a Complaint Page, supra note
71 (announcing that "Consumer Services cannot ... resolve a dispute that is a question of
fact"); Maine Bureau of Insurance's Filing Complaints Page, http://www.maine.gov/pfr/
insurance/complaint.htm#a (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
110. See Whitford & Kimball, supra note 5, at 665 (describing the letter that the
department sent to consumers when a dispute rested on a factual or legal issue, justifying
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that such questions of fact or law fall outside of the insurance
department's "regulatory" authority."' But it is hard to understand
what this means, because almost all complaints that implicate
regulatory issues can also be described as involving either a legal or
factual dispute. For instance, a complaint that an insurer improperly
denied a claim could reveal a potential violation of the insurer's
regulatory obligation to "adopt and implement reasonable standards
for the prompt investigation and settlement of claims" or could be
described as a mere question of law or fact."2  Moreover, no laws
prevent regulators from attempting to resolve disputes that do not
involve regulatory violations, and most insurance departments report
that they do indeed attempt to resolve such complaints."3
Finally, regulator conciliation of consumer complaints may tend
to be biased in favor of insurers. To some extent, this possibility is
correlated with the prospect of regulatory capture, which many have
argued is a significant problem in the insurance industry."4 But there
are particular reasons why regulatory complaint handlers may tend to
favor insurer interests in processing consumer complaints. As noted
above, virtually any insurance complaint can be framed as either a
legal or factual conflict, allowing complaint handlers to disregard
certain complaints in a way that may reflect conscious or unconscious
biases. One study of the California Department of Insurance in 1980
noted just such a trend, reporting that complaint handlers would
disregard complaints based on "the personality of the complainant and
the estimated straightforwardness of the case.""' It also reported that
refusal to proceed further by observing that "the Office was a regulatory not a judicial
agency").
111. See id; Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Mkt. Analysis & Priorities Working Group,
Adopted Definitions of Dispositions (on file with author).
112. 2 OFFICIAL N.A.I.C. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT, supra
note 36, § 4.
113. WHITE PAPER, supra note 80, at 15.
114. See BAKER, supra note 14, at 53 (noting that while "Itjhere has been no
systematic, scholarly study of the effectiveness of state regulation of insurance forms," most
assume that such regulation is inadequate); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at
Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REv. 961, 967 (1970) ("Regulation is relatively
weak in most instances, and even the provisions prescribed or approved by legislative or
administrative action ordinarily are in essence adoptions, outright or slightly modified, of
proposals made by insurers' draftsmen."); Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United
States: Regulatory Federalism and the NationalAssociation of Insurance Commissioners, 26
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 639 (1999) (arguing that "the problem of capture as it exists in other
regulatory contexts is minimal when compared to the problem in the insurance industry" for
various reasons, including that "[t]he industry directly funds" the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners).
115. Serber, supra note 5, at 329-31.
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this reasoning was used to "deselect complaints" lodged by "people
who [could] be fooled or who [would] not or [could not] challenge the
staff." 6  A more recent article similarly raised concerns about the
fairness of disaster insurance mediation specifically, suggesting that
the disparity in sophistication between insurers and consumers results
in the process significantly favoring insurers.' 7
In sum, while the conciliation services provided by state
insurance regulators are no doubt beneficial for consumers, they are
also quite limited. Regulators are often unable to convince insurers to
compromise on seemingly legitimate consumer complaints, they have
inadequate resources to devote to these complaints, and complaint
handlers' neutrality is not guaranteed.
B. Arbitration of Insurance Coverage Disputes
1. An Overview
Predispute, mandatory arbitration provisions are seemingly
ubiquitous in consumer contracts, regularly appearing in agreements
governing cell phone plans, credit cards, rental cars and countless other
consumer transactions."' This proliferation of arbitration requirements
is largely attributable to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which
prevents states from significantly interfering with arbitration
agreements." 9 But unlike all other fields of consumer law, the FAA
poses no obstacle to states regulating or prohibiting insurance-specific
arbitration laws: under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, state laws that
regulate insurance trump federal statutes of general applicability, such
as the FAA.'2° This unique legal backdrop has allowed states to
regulate insurance policy terms governing arbitration.'2
116. Idat331.
117. SeeMurrill, supranote 100, at 403.
118. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" To Arbitrate
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer Experience, 67 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 57 (2004); William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contracts
for Law, Forum and Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 1, 1 (2006); cf Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler, "Unfair" Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About Nothing?, in OMRJ BEN-
SHAHAR, BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45 (2007) (finding limited
evidence of strategic use of arbitration clauses in a sample of end-user license agreements).
119. See BRUNET ET A., supra note 4, at 157-59 (describing various state efforts to
protect consumers from mandatory arbitration and noting that most of them "have been
rendered substantially irrelevant by [a] series of Supreme Court decisions").
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006).
121. See Randall, supra note 16, at 264.
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States have used this capacity to experiment with insurance
arbitration schemes in a few key areas.'22 The most long-standing
example is the "appraisal" clause found in virtually all auto and
homeowners policies.' These clauses originally appeared in state-
mandated fire insurance policies and continue to be mandatory in most
states. 1 4 Under the appraisal clause, two independent experts, each of
whom is selected by one of the parties, resolve disputes about the
extent of loss to insured property."' Appraisal is not available to
resolve disputes about the existence of coverage."' In general, the
appraisal process is highly informal and involves the selected
appraisers independently investigating the loss and reaching a joint
conclusion.' Parties generally bear the costs of hiring their
• 128
appraiser. In many states, appraisal can be waived by one, or both,
parties, who can opt for litigation rather than appraisal at the time the
dispute arises."'
States have more recently experimented with insurance
arbitration when it comes to certain limited health insurance
122. This Article adopts a broad definition of "arbitration" that encompasses all
instances in which a private third party is endowed with the power to bind one, or both,
disputants to a particular outcome.
123. Seegenerally Richard C. Bennett, Use and Purpose, in INSURING REAL PROPERTY
§ 30.01 (Stephen A. Cozen ed., 2003); Timothy P. Law & Jillian L. Starinovich, Wat Is It
Worth? A Critical Analysis of Insurance Appraisal, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 291 (2007). In the
auto insurance context, appraisal clauses may accrue to the benefit of auto shops, not
consumers, if they involve disputes about the charge that the repair shop sends the insurer.
But appraisal can also benefit consumers in total loss situations or other cases in which they
are directly paid by insurers for their losses.
124. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (Deering 1992) (fire insurance policy with
appraisal provision); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-44-15 (2007) (same). Standard fire insurance
policies set a floor for property fire insurance coverage in most states. See BAKER, supra note
14, at 350; Bennett, supra note 123. Some states explicitly require by statute that consumer
property insurers offer appraisal to resolve all disputes over the actual cash value of damage
to property. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.89.035 (LexisNexis 2002) (mandating appraisal
clauses in all auto and property coverage policies). Where there is no statutory mandate, it is
still highly unlikely that a state regulator would approve a consumer property insurance form
that did not contain an appraisal clause.
125. Although each party chooses its own appraiser, both must be competent and
independent, and they are frequently licensed by state regulators. See Bennett, supra note
123; Law & Starinovich, supra note 123, at 318-19.
126. Law & Starinovich, supra note 123, at 295.
127. See id. at 292-93; id at 299 ("[A]rbitration provisions do not require the
procedural formality of arbitration proceedings."). Although the basic structure of the
appraisal process is uniform, some of the details differ by state. See id at 293 ("Insurance
policies typically provide little instruction or guidance about how an appraisal is to be
conducted, and state laws and precedent vary in their treatment of such provisions.").
Generally appraisers choose an umpire to resolve disagreements between them. Id at 294.
128. Bennett, supra note 123; Law & Starinovich, supra note 123, at 294.
129. See Bennett, supra note 123.
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d. , 131disputes.3 Most states require health insurers"' to offer policyholders
"external review" of any coverage denial that is predicated on the
insurer's determination that a treatment is not "medically necessary. ' 32
Such external review is performed by independent doctors, who are
part of external review organizations (EROs)."' States typically certify
EROs and nominally monitor their decisions for quality and
objectivity." Additionally, states generally specify the procedures of
external review, such as what evidence can be considered and when
hearings can be held.'35 The external review process is paper-based,
involving the ERO doctors reviewing the medical evaluations of the
insurer and any independent doctors and assessing whether the insurer
has followed proper procedures.'
States typically require that complainants first exhaust their
insurer's internal review procedures, before invoking external review."'
Unlike the internal review procedures in other lines of insurance,13
most states mandate relatively well-developed internal grievance
processes for health insurers. 39 The documents, information, and
130. Rush PrudentialHiMO, Inc. v Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 377-80 (2002), distinguishes
external review from arbitration in assessing whether ERISA preempts external review
because it is an "alternative remedy" for ERISA violations. Regardless, external review
clearly fits the broad definition of arbitration used in this Article. See discussion supra note
122.
131. Under ERISA, self-funded employer plans are not subject to these laws. See
Rush, 536 U.S. at 371-72 n.6.
132. See generally Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of
Accountability in Health Care, 6 YALE J. HEALTH PoL'Y L. & ETHics 93, 128-40 (2006). In
2006, over forty states required such external review. Id at 128-32. Recently, even more
states have adopted similar laws. See Health Carrier External Review ModelAct, in NAIC
MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES, supra note 75, at 75-1. A few states have also
extended the breadth of external review to include other types of coverage determinations,
including determinations that a treatment is experimental. Hunter, supra, at 129.
133. Hunter, supra note 132, at 122-27.
134. Seeid at 156. Such monitoring can be performed by state agencies, designated
panels, or private accreditation organizations. See id.; Leatrice Berman-Sandler, Independent
Medical Review: Expanding Legal Remedies To Achieve Managed Care Accountability, 13
ANNALS HEALTH L. 233, 239 (2004).
135. See Hunter, supra note 132, at 132-36. "External Review laws [therefore] use
process itself as a structure of accountability." Id. at 143.
136. Id.
137. Health CarnierExternalReviewModelAc4 supra note 132, § 7.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
139. The NAIC's model act governing health care grievances requires insurers to
include a significant amount of information in internal grievance-handling decisions sent to
insureds, including the titles and credentials of the people reviewing the grievance, a
statement of the reviewers' understanding of the grievance, the reviewers' decision and
rationale in sufficient detail for the insured to respond further to the insurer's position, and
references to all evidence and documentation used as the basis for the decision. Health
Camer Grievance Procedure Model Ac in NAIC MODEL LAw, REGULATIONS AND
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correspondence generated during this process are usually, but not
always, part of any record that is before an external review panel. 140 In
most states, consumers are charged little or no fee for external
review 4' and they generally do not hire lawyers. Policyholders in
most states do not need to invoke external review as a prerequisite to
suing their insurer.
143
Outside of appraisal and external review, states have generally
used their insurance-specific exemption from the FAA to prohibit or
otherwise restrict arbitration. Approximately twenty jurisdictions
prohibit predispute, mandatory arbitration provisions in insurance
policies.'" Other states limit certain types of arbitration clauses,
requiring particular procedural safeguards or notice requirements for
arbitration agreements in health insurance, life insurance, or other
policies.' Significantly, a newly developed Interstate Insurance
Compact-which establishes and enforces uniform product standards
for thirty-two states in life insurance, annuities, disability insurance,
and long-term-care insurance146-bans all predispute, binding
arbitration provisions. 147 Although many states and territories do not
explicitly prohibit arbitration provisions in consumer insurance
policies, insurers in those states usually do not include general
GUIDELINES, suprm note 75, at 72-1, § 6(G)(l-5). At least one state has adopted this aspect of
the NAIC model act verbatim. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7308 (LexisNexis 2005).
Many other state statutes require insurers to explain grievance decisions to insureds, but they
are often not as specific as the NAIC model. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.511(0 (West
2005) (requiring only that insurers establish procedures to "notify the [insured] of a final
decision in writing").
140. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.7056 (West Supp. 2004). But see MINN. STAT.
§ 62Q.73 (2005) (requiring insurers to provide to external review entity only "any
information [the insurer] wish[es] to be considered"). The NAIC's model act for external
review requires insurers to provide to the external review organization "the documents and
any information considered in making the adverse determination or final adverse
determination." Health Carmier External Review ModelAct supra note 132, § 8(E)(1).
141. Health Carrier External Review ModelAc; supra note 132, at 75-1, § 12.
142. Berman-Sandler, supranote 134, at 261-62; Hunter, supranote 132, at 134.
143. SeeHunter, supranote 132, at 137-38.
144. See Randall, supra note 16, at 270-71 (citing eight jurisdictions that explicitly
prohibit arbitration clauses in insurance policies and eleven that have the effect of doing so by
explicitly excluding insurance from their state versions of the FAA).
145. Seeid at272-73.
146. See generally Interstate Insurance Product Regulation Commission Web Site,
http://www.insurancecompact.org/index.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
147. See Interstate Insurance Product Regulation Commission, Record, http://www.
insurancecompact.org/compact.rlmkng-record.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) (including in
every Policy Standard a provision that "[o]nly arbitration provisions that permit voluntary
post-dispute binding arbitration shall be allowed in policy forms").
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1" • 148
arbitration provisions in their policies, outside of managed health1450
care149 and uninsured/underinsured automobile coverage.
To be sure, several enterprising states have more affirmatively
experimented with consumer insurance arbitration schemes. For
instance, four of the dozen "no fault" auto insurance states require auto
insurers to participate in an arbitration scheme."' Additionally, at least
one state, Delaware, requires that insurers make arbitration available to
148. To be sure, some insurers do use arbitration provisions in their policies, and some
assert that this trend is on the rise. Randall, supra note 16, at 253-54 ("Arbitration provisions
are appearing with increasing frequency in all types of insurance policies."); see Public
Citizen, Arbitration Clauses in Insurance Contracts: The Urgent Need for Reform,
http://www.citizen.org/printarticle.cfinlD=6561 (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) ("The growing
use of binding, pre-dispute arbitration clauses poses a huge threat to insurance consumers.").
Whatever the trend, general arbitration clauses are certainly not the norm in most basic
consumer insurance policies, including homeowners, renters, and auto. See ALAN I. WIDISS
& JEFFREY E. THOMAS, UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 22.3 (2005) ("[I]n the
absence of statutory mandates, the insurance industry has not introduced arbitration clauses
in other types of coverage [aside from uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage]."); Ins.
Servs. Org., Standardized Insurance Policy Forms, available at http://www.iso.com/
Producs/ISOnet/Forms/Fonrms-Library-on-ISOnet-standardized-insurance-policy-forms.html
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009); see also Kenneth S. Abraham & J.W Montgomery, HI, The
Lawlessness ofArbitration, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 355, 358 (2003) ("Few standard-form primary
commercial liability and property insurance policies issued by American insurers contain
arbitration clauses."). It is difficult to explain insurers' apparent ambivalence to arbitration in
states that do not limit the use of these clauses. While insurers may fear triggering enhanced
regulatory or judicial scrutiny, they may also be responding to consumer demand or be wary
of schemes that make policyholders more likely to challenge coverage decisions.
149. See Elizabeth Rolph, Erik Moller & John E. Rolph, Arbitration Agreements in
Health Care.- Myths and Reality, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 173 (1997) (finding that
most HMOs require arbitration of contract disputes with enrollees, while PPOs do not).
150. For uninsured/underinsured coverage, policy provisions usually require the
arbitration of disputes involving (1) whether the policyholder could recover damages from the
uninsured/underinsured driver and (2) how much he could recover. Alan I. Widiss, The
Enforceability of Arbitration Terms in Uninsured Motorist Coverages and Other Form
Contracts, 66 IowA L. REv. 241, 246 (1981). Insurers popularized this innovation in order to
avoid conflicts of interest that are distinctive to uninsured/undersinsured coverage. See id at
245 (exploring how insurers may simultaneously have an incentive to show that (1) their
policyholder, rather than the underinsured/uninsured driver, was at fault in the accident, and
(2) the underinsured/uninsured driver, rather than the policyholder, was at fault in the
accident, and how insurers solved this conflict by requiring arbitration of disputes concerning
the first issue). Some states regulate the arbitral procedures and selection of arbitrators for
uninsured/underinsured arbitration. See, e.g., Rules for Arbitration of Supplementary
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Insurance Disputes and Uninsured Motorist Insurance
Disputes in the State of New York, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22086 (last visited Nov. 16,
2008).
151. See HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431:10C-213 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT.
§ 65B.525 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-5(i) (West Supp. 2008); N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106
(McKinney 2000). Two other states also have procedures for arbitration of no-fault claims in
place, but require the assent of both parties. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 21180)(5) (1999);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-2405 (LexisNexis 2001). See generally MATTHEW BENDER, NO-FAULT
AND UNINSURED MOTORIST AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE § 15 (2008).
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consumers in disputes arising out of auto, homeowners, and health
insurance.'52 In both instances, states employ the same basic consumer
protections that exist in the external review and appraisal contexts.
First, in two of the four "no fault" arbitration states, the consumer can
opt for litigation rather than arbitration after the dispute arises. 1 3 The
same consumer choice at the time of dispute is built into the Delaware
scheme.'54 Second, in both cases, the state specifies the arbitral
procedures and chooses a panel of acceptable arbitrators.'55
2. Evaluating the Success of Insurance Arbitration
Evaluating the success of consumer insurance arbitration requires a
baseline view of the desirability of such arbitration. This is hardly a
simple proposition. Numerous academics have debated the desirability of
arbitration for consumers, and Congress has recently considered several
bills that would curtail the use of predispute, mandatory arbitration
provisions. '1 6 Proponents of arbitration often claim that it has the virtues
of increased speed and decreased cost, expert decision makers, and
confidentiality.'57 Critics counter that it tends to favor repeat players,
suppress public information, produce suboptimal levels of precedent, have
little impact in practice on costs or speed, and undermine class action
lawsuits or punitive damages.'58
152. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 331; id tit. 21, § 2118; 18-900-901 DEL. CODE
REGS. § 2 (3/1/2002).
153. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 431:1OC-213; N.J. STAT.ANN. § 39:6A-5(i).
154. See Interview with Julia Moore, Arbitration Sec'y for the Del. Ins. Comm'r (Apr.
22, 2008).
155. Three of the four no-fault states that require arbitration (New York, Minnesota,
and New Jersey) have special procedures, administered through the American Arbitration
Association or the National Arbitration Forum, which must be followed in no-fault
arbitrations. BENDER, supm note 151, § 15.30. In each case, the parties must select
arbitrators from a preapproved panel. See id Similarly, the process of arbitration in
Delaware is mandated by regulation. See 18-900-901 DEL CODE REGS. § 2. Arbitrators are
volunteer attorneys who are paid a nominal amount and whose decisions records and awards
are monitored by the department. See Interview with Julia M. Moore, supa note 154.
156. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3010, 110th
Cong. (2007). For a good summary of recent empirical literature on consumer arbitration,
see Kirk D. Jensen, Summaries of Empir'cal Studies and Surveys Regarding How Individuals
Fare inArbiation, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REv. 631 (2006).
157. See, e.g., Estreicher, supa note 4, at 564; Ware, supm note 4, at 89-93 (arguing
that the efficiency of arbitration can ultimately benefit consumers).
158. Budnitz, supra note 4, at 133-34; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 38-57
(suggesting that arbitration may enhance the repeat-player advantage, but noting an absence
of empirical evidence); Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 4, at 30 (focusing on the secrecy
and lack of precedent in arbitration); Sternlight, supra note 4, at 1649 (arguing that firms
design arbitration clauses to benefit themselves); Stemlight & Jensen, supra note 4, at 77-92
(discussing how mandatory arbitration can eliminate class actions); W Mark C. Weidemaier,
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The desirability of arbitration is no clearer in the specific context
of insurance law. On one hand, there are legitimate reasons to think
that concerns about arbitration may be enhanced when it comes to
consumer insurance disputes. 9 Consumer insurance arbitration may
be unusually susceptible to biased decision making given the intensity
of the "repeat player" problem in insurance and the malleability of
insurance law.'60  Moreover, the secrecy of most forms of consumer
arbitration may be particularly unfavorable to long-run consumer
interests because of the importance of reputation to the functioning of
consumer insurance markets. 6 ' However, arbitration may also offer
distinctive potential benefits for insurance consumers. As described in
Part I, the slow pace of litigation and its potential cost are particularly
problematic for aggrieved insurance consumers. To the extent that
arbitration allows policyholders to easily, cheaply, and quickly
challenge their insurer's adverse coverage decision, it helps to offset
these concerns.'62 For related reasons, it may encourage settlement by
lending credibility to plaintiffs' threats to challenge coverage
decisions.
63
Weighing these competing costs and benefits of consumer
arbitration is ultimately a subjective enterprise. 64 Several commenta-
tors have consequently proposed shifting away from the familiar
debate about arbitration's desirability relative to litigation and towards
a discussion of the best way to improve current arbitration practices
through targeted regulation.' Unfortunately, such regulation is usually
Arbitration and the lndividuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. REv. 69 (2007) (describing and
critiquing the repeat-player advantage in arbitration).
159. See genetlly Randall, supra note 16, at 257-63; Public Citizen, supra note 148.
160. Abraham & Montgomery, supra note 148, at 361-68; Randall, supra note 16, at
258-59.
161. On the importance of reputation in consumer insurance markets, see Schwarcz,
supra note 15, at 1412-15. Not all forms of arbitration are secretive. For instance, securities
and labor arbitration awards are published, and some employment arbitrations are also
published. See genetrally Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the
Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 1255 (2006).
162. See Sykes, supra note 15, at 422 (suggesting that mandatory arbitration in
insurance contracts might be desirable because it could decrease the time insureds wait for
recovery and thus reduce opportunism by insurers).
163. See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995).
164. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 4, at 151 ("While some of the policy differences
between critics and defenders are philosophical and theoretical, others rest on different
impressions of the empirical world.").
165. A number of ADR scholars have proposed such regulation of arbitration. See,
e.g., Paul Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution Provisions in Adhesion Contracts, 35
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 225 (1998); Amy Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes Through
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stymied by the FAA and federal lawmakers' refusal to interfere with
privately drafted arbitration provisions.'66 But because states have
unique authority to regulate insurance arbitration, this shift in focus is
particularly appropriate in the insurance context. Thus, the relevant
inquiry here is not whether arbitration of consumer insurance dispute
is desirable. Rather, it is whether states have used their unique
regulatory authority in the realm of insurance to harness the strengths
of arbitration while limiting its weaknesses.
Judged by this metric, consumer insurance arbitration in the
United States is, at most, only modestly successful. Most states have
done little to promote insurance arbitration outside of the highly
specific areas of property valuation and medical necessity disputes.
For the vast majority of insurance coverage disputes, states have either
largely ignored arbitration or have merely sought to ban mandatory
arbitration terms. Regardless of which of these approaches is
preferable, both fail to harness the potential benefits of arbitration
while limiting its costs.
Where states have experimented with arbitration, they have
designed schemes that are closely tied to the underlying dispute's
subject matter and that, therefore, have limited application to other
types of insurance disputes. First, both appraisal and external review
attempt to limit the repeat-player problem of arbitration by using
experts-such as automotive specialists, real estate appraisers, and
doctors-to resolve factual disputes. Of course, experts often have
divergent views that can implicate repeat-player problems.'67 But
experts are nonetheless viewed by many as being less susceptible to
biased decision making than ordinary arbitrators because of their
professional training and the "objectivity" of the underlying subject
matter."' At the very least, this veneer of objectivity helps mitigate the
RegulatedArbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 627 (2008); Richard Speidel, Consumer
Arbitration of Statutory Claims Has Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its
Welcone? 40 ARIz. L. REv. 1069 (1998); Jeffrey W Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from
Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEv. L.J. 251, 260-64 (2007).
166. Schmitz, supra note 165, at 629.
167. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 132, at 156 (criticizing the ERO system because it
"lacks sufficient mechanisms either to correct for possible bias or to enhance quality by
review of the most difficult, and indeterminate, medical judgments"); cf Murrill, supra note
100, at 403 (expressing concerns about the advantages that mass disaster ADR programs may
give to insurers).
168. See Hunter, supra note 132, at 101-21 (describing, and disputing, "the norm of
deference to physician judgment," which is based on the notion that doctors have access to a
"body of expert scientific knowledge"); Susan Stefan, Leaving CivilRights to the "Experts"
From Deference to Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J.
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perception that appraisal and external review unduly favor repeat
players.
The expertise-driven subject matter of appraisal and external
review may have other, nontransferable, benefits as well. For instance,
regulations can require specific professional qualifications for expert
decision makers, such as doctors and appraisers, whereas it would be
difficult to craft such requirements for ordinary arbitrators.'
69
Although ordinary arbitrators are not state-approved, they typically are
licensed, or otherwise regulated, in each of the consumer insurance
arbitration schemes described above."' Additionally, the relative
insignificance of precedent in arbitration-which typically exacerbates
insurers' repeat-player advantage'7'-may be less problematic in
expertise-driven arbitrations such as appraisal and external review. In
these types of cases, where disputes typically concern factual rather
than legal issues, legal precedent tends to be of limited importance
regardless of the procedure that is used to adjudicate the parties'
rights.' Consequently, repeat players have less capacity to game the
arbitral system by learning the decision-making tendencies of
individual arbitrators.
Second, appraisal and external review both offer the prospect of
genuinely faster and more accessible dispute resolution than litigation
for reasons that are similarly tied to the underlying subject matter of
the disputes. 3 Both forms of ADR can be distinguished from
"ordinary" arbitration because they are relatively informal, are paper-
based, and incorporate elements of an inquisitorial, rather than
639, 655-62 (1992) (describing the various ways in which law assumes that professionals are
neutral, but disputing the validity of this view).
169. Most professions, including the medical profession and real estate appraisal
profession, have clearly developed licensing standards.
170. See supra Part II.B. 1 (describing licensing and monitoring of EROs, appraisers,
arbitrators in no-fault states, and Delaware arbitrators). For a convincing argument that all
arbitrators should be licensed and approved, see Stempel, supra note 165, at 260-64.
171. Abraham & Montgomery, supra note 148, at 360 ("Because arbitrations are
essentially confidential and set no precedents ... each arbitration is an island unto itself, not
governed by any prior arbitration outcomes.....). This may work to the benefit of insurers,
who are better able than nonrepeat players to learn the patterns of specific arbitrators.
172. See id. This may be particularly true when it comes to factual disputes requiring
expertise, because expert arbitrators employ decision-making criteria that are the output of
their professions, rather than of precedent.
173. The potential benefits of a speedy and inexpensive forum may also be
particularly significant in the appraisal and review contexts. In the health care context,
coverage denials based on medical necessity determinations require fast decision making
because they typically prevent patients from getting the treatment they seek. Similarly,
valuation disputes tend to be too small in monetary value to allow policyholders to find
representation on a contingency fee basis.
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adversarial, method.' These design features are key reasons that
appraisal and external review prove more accessible and efficient than
litigation. Policyholders generally need not hire lawyers and the
process proceeds much more quickly than ordinary arbitration.'75 By
contrast, there is some empirical evidence that the elaborate
procedures of ordinary arbitration, along with its adversarial style,
often render it no faster or more accessible than litigation.
76
Unfortunately, informal procedures and inquisitorial inquiry are
not likely to prove feasible in domains outside of external review and
appraisal. In most disputes, adversarial presentation and elaborate
procedural protections are necessary to ensure the fairness of the
dispute resolution process. 177  These safeguards can justifiably be
limited in external review and appraisal only to the extent that one is
convinced that the risk of biased decision making is muted in disputes,
such as these, where experts decide factual questions.'78 Regardless of
how one evaluates that claim, it obviously has no purchase outside of
the realms of appraisal and external review.
In sum, states have done little to harness the benefits and limit the
costs of consumer arbitration in the domain of insurance, even though
they have unique authority to do so. Where states have actively
promoted consumer insurance arbitration, they have done so only
where the risk of a repeat-player problem is perceived to be low and
the prospect of increased accessibility is high. Although
commendable, these efforts are consequently of limited use for
crafting reform of consumer insurance arbitration more broadly.
174. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing informal and inquisitorial elements of external
review and appraisal).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 127, 142.
176. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 4, at 18 (noting little empirical evidence that
arbitration guarantees a more efficient process than trial and suggesting that trials can be as
efficient as arbitration according to some new evidence); Herbert M. Kritzer & Jill K.
Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative Analysis of Case Processing Time,
Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association and the Courts, 8 JUST.
Sys. J. 6, 18 (1983) (finding that arbitration may, on average, take just as long as litigation
due to the fact there exists less settlement in the arbitration context); Ware, supra note 4, at
89-93.
177. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 4, at 567-68; Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of
the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 369, 387-89 (2004); Schmitz, supra
note 165, at 637.
178. SeeHunter, supranote 132, at 101-21; Stefan, supranote 168, at 655-62.
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111. THE PRIVATE OMBUDSMAN MODEL FOR RESOLVING INSURANCE
DISPUTES AND ITS AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS
Given the states' poor track records for facilitating consumer
insurance ADR, this Part looks beyond our own borders for direction.
Of the many potential models, the British scheme for resolving
consumer financial disputes, which is known as the Financial
Ombudsman Service (FOS),7 9 is the most natural source of guidance.
Indeed, "the United States and United Kingdom are often portrayed as
fellow travelers in the world of financial regulation," given "their
shared traditions of laissez-faire capitalism, common-law jurispru-
dence, self-regulatory organization[s], and disclosure-based securities
regulation.""'8  In the insurance realm, in particular, the United
Kingdom has recently served as a model for would-be reformers of
regulation.'8 ' Moreover, the United Kingdom's insurance market is
one of the few in the world that approaches the United States in size
and complexity.'82
The FOS traces its history to the early 1970s, when the British
consumer insurance industry was widely believed to be in a state of
disrepair.' In response, three British insurance companies voluntarily
formed an independent "Insurance Ombudsman Bureau" (IOB) that
179. Few sources in American legal literature have discussed the FOS, but a number of
academic sources from the United Kingdom and from international journals do focus on the
FOS. See generally JAMES, supra note 6; Sharon Gilad, Accountability or Expectations
Management? The Role of the Ombudsman in Financial Regulation, 30 LAw & POL'Y 227
(2008); James & Morris, supra note 8; Ian MacNeil, Consumer Dispute Resolution in the UK
Financial Sector The Experience of the Financial Ombudsman Service, LAW & FIN.
MARKETS REv., Nov. 2007, at 515; Philip Rawlings & Chris Willett, Ombudsman Schemes in
the United Kingdom' Financial Sector. The Insurance Ombudsman, the Banking
Ombudsman, and the Building Societies Ombudsman, 17 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 307 (1994);
Yokoi-Arai, supa note 12.
180. Howell E. Jackson, An American Perspective on the UK. Financial Services
Authority Politics, Goals & Regulatory Intensity 2 (Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper
No. 522, 2005), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/papers/pdf/
Jackson_- 522.pdf.
181. See, e.g., Elizabeth R Brown, E Pluribus Unum--Out of Many, One: Why the
United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 1, 74-100
(2005); Elizabeth F Brown, The FatalFlaw of Proposals To Federalize Insurance 73-75 (Univ.
of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 07-25, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid= 1008993#.
182. Whereas the American insurance market is the largest in the world, accounting for
thirty-one percent of worldwide premium income, Britain's market is the third largest in the
world (behind Japan), accounting for eleven percent of worldwide premium income. See
ASS'N OF BRITISH INSURERS, UK INSURANCE-KEY FAcTS 3 (2007), available at
http://www.abi.org.uk/BookShop/ResearchReports/UK%20lnsurance%20-
%20Key/o20Facts%202007.pdf.
183. SeeTyldesley & Paruk, supra note 9.
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had many of the same basic features as the current FOS.'" The JOB
investigated consumers' complaints and, when appropriate, ordered
member insurers to pay up to £100,000 to the consumer.' 85 Consumers
who were not pleased with the IOB's decision were free to sue in
court.186 The JOB expanded quickly, with virtually all insurers joining
it within a few years.8 7 In the next two decades, seven other British
industries developed their own "private ombudsman" schemes based
on the insurance industry model.' By 2000, the British Parliament
formally joined the JOB with its peer consumer financial ombudsman
organizations to form the FOS. 189  Today, the FOS employs
approximately 825 people and works with a budget of approximately
£50 million.'" Its jurisdiction extends to virtually all consumer
financial services, including insurance, banking, and investment. 91 In
recent years, seventeen to twenty-two percent of its total caseload has
involved complaints about insurance.'92
This Part compares the FOS with its American counterparts.
Subpart A describes the FOS in detail, comparing it to consumer
insurance ADR in the United States. Subpart B then argues that many
of the FOS's constitutive elements mirror consumer insurance ADR in
the United States. It concludes with a puzzle that is the subject of Part
IV: how can it be that the FOS is so much more successful than its
American counterparts when many of its basic features seem to
resemble the American system?
A. The FOSs Process ofDispute Resolution
The FOS can be understood to utilize four stages of dispute
resolution: (1) internal complaint procedures, (2) a frontline call
184. Id.
185. See Rawlings & Willett, supra note 179, at 311-17; Tyldesley & Paruk, supra note
9.
186. See Rawlings & Willett, supra note 179, at 311-17; Tyldesley & Paruk, supm note
9.
187. See Sharon Gilad, Exchange Without Capture: The UK Financial Ombudsman
Service ' Sftuggle for Accepted Domain, 86 PUB. ADMIN. 907, 910-11 (2008); Rawlings &
Willett, supra note 179, at 311.
188. James & Morris, supm note 8, at 167.
189. Id. at 172.
190. FIN. OMBUDSMAN SERV., ANNUAL REVIEW 2007/08, at 49 (2008), http://www.
fmancial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ar08/arO8.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL REVIEW '08].
Case fees, discussed infm Part IVA.2, supply the FOS with about sixty-four percent of its
funding, with the remainder coming from a general tax on the industry. See ANNUAL REVIEW
'08, supra, at 50.
191. ANNUAL REvrEw '08, supra note 190, at 64.
192. Id. at 18.
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office, (3) adjudicator conciliation, and (4) ombudsman review. This
Part describes these four stages, emphasizing how each one resembles
an element of American consumer insurance ADR.
1. Stage One: Internal Complaints
Before consumers can complain to the FOS, they must first lodge
a grievance with their insurer and provide it with eight weeks to
address the complaint.' This echoes, and formalizes, the recom-
mendations of many state insurance regulators that consumers first
contact their insurer before lodging a complaint. 94  Similarly, as in
most American states, British insurers must maintain their own internal
complaint handling procedures.'95 But British firms are required not
simply to keep track of basic data about internal complaints but also to
investigate those complaints and to respond to them in writing within
eight weeks.'96 All such responses must inform policyholders of their
right to refer the case to the FOS and must also contain a separate
pamphlet, written by the FOS, about the FOS process. 97  Internal
complaint handling in the United Kingdom, therefore, more closely
resembles the robust American rules governing internal complaints in
health insurance than the more general American internal review rules
for insurers.'98 Additionally, whereas most American states define a
complaint only to include written expressions of grievances, the British
definition encompasses oral expressions of dissatisfaction as well.' 99
193. FIN. SERVS. AUTH. (FSA), DISPUTE RESOLUTION: COMPLAINTS § 1.6.2 (2008),
available athttp://fsahandbook.info/FSA/htmVhandbook/DISP [hereinafter FSA HANDBOOK].
194. See supra text accompanying note 71.
195. See generally ADAM SAMUEL, CONSUMER COMPLAINTS AND COMPENSATION: A
GUIDE FOR THE FINANCIAL SERVICES MARKET (2005) (comprehensively reviewing the internal
complaint-handling rules for consumer financial services firms); Adam Samuel, Consumer
Financial Services in Britain: NewApproaches to Dispute Resolution andAvoidance, 3 EUR.
Bus. ORG. L. REv. 649, 674-77 (2002) (describing internal complaint-handling rules).
196. SeeFSA HANDBOOK, supranote 193, § 1.6.2; Samuel, supranote 195, at 676.
197. See FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 193, § 1.6.2. These rules are intended to ensure
"[e]ffective and transparent procedures for the reasonable and prompt handling of
complaints." Id. § 1.3.1 (emphasis in original); Samuel, supra note 195, at 676.
198. Compare supra text accompanying notes 73-75 with supra text accompanying
notes 138-141.
199. FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 193, glossary C (defining a complaint as "any oral
or written expression of dissatisfaction, whether justified or not.., about the provision of, or
failure to provide, a financial service").
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2. Stage Two: The Frontline Call Center
All complaints to the FOS are initially routed to a call center,
which is roughly analogous to the branches of state insurance offices
that answer incoming consumer calls.200 As with state regulators, the
services of the FOS are available to consumers free of charge.20 ' FOS
call center employees perform many of the same duties as state
regulators, ensuring that the consumer has lodged an internal
complaint, that the complaint is within the FOS's jurisdiction, and that
the grievance is timely.202  Call center employees also mirror state
regulators in their initial treatment of a call: like American regulators,
they first determine whether the call is merely an inquiry or a
complaint and assess the FOS's jurisdiction over the complaint. °3
There are at least two differences between the FOS call center
and American regulators' processes for initially processing consumer
complaints. First, call center employees contact the consumer's insurer
and ask it to forward its response to the consumer from stage one, the
internal complaint handling process.2 4 Second, once a call center
employee designates a consumer complaint as an official "case," the
firm is required to pay a £450 ($675) fee, regardless of the case's
subsequent trajectory.'°5  Call center employees often attempt to
resolve relatively straight-forward complaints with a firm quickly,
before the matter is designated as a case and the firm is charged.2 6
3. Stage Three: Adjudicator Conciliation
Once the call center elevates a complaint to an official "case," it
is routed to an "adjudicator. '20 7 Adjudicators are quite similar to the
"complaint investigators" in state regulators' offices: they are drawn
200. See ANNUAL REVIEW '08, supm note 190, at 12-14; supra text accompanying
notes 77-84.
201. See Key Facts About the Financial Ombudsman Service, http://www.financial
ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ar08/index.html#a 1 (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
202. Seeid atl2-14.
203. Id. at 13-14.
204. See James & Morris, supra note 8, at 179-80; Samuel, supra note 195.
205. See ANNUAL REVIEW '08, supra note 190, at 49, 66; Fin. Ombudsman Serv., A
Quick Guide To Funding and Case Fees, http://www.fmancial-ombudsman.org.uk/
publications/technical notes/QG1.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2008). Finns need not pay the
case fee if the case is one of the first two cases of the year involving their firm. SeeANNUAL
REVIEW '08, supra note 190. This fee structure is intended to reduce the case fee's impact on
small firms. Fin. Ombudsman Serv., Consultation Paper ch. 6 (June 2006), http://www.
financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/technicalnotes/consumer-credit/6.htm.
206. ANNUAL REVIEW '08, supranote 187, at 12-14.
207. Id. at 14-15.
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from a wide variety of backgrounds, including from inside the
industry, from legal practice, from public interest organizations, and
from dispute resolution backgrounds. 28  They investigate the
consumer's complaint by collecting and examining relevant docu-
ments. 209 Adjudicators' investigations are "inquisitorial" in the sense
that they are not limited by the specific claims that complainants
articulate.210 As with regulatory complaint investigators, adjudicators
have no legal authority to issue binding decisions on individual
disputes."' Adjudicators nonetheless attempt to encourage settlements
between consumers and insurers that are consistent with their view of
the case, using a process that the FOS terms "guided conciliation."
2'1 2
Despite the many similarities in the roles of FOS adjudicators and
state complaint investigators, there are several important distinctions as
well. First, unlike state regulators, adjudicators' evaluations of cases in
the course of guided conciliation focus heavily on the insurer's internal
complaint file.2"  Recall that the insurer prepares this file before the
consumer ever complains to the FOS. By contrast, in most states,
insurers' internal complaint files do not contain any analysis of the
complaint, and complaint investigators rely principally on the insurer's
prepared response to the investigator.1 4
208. See Interview with Melissa Collett, Ombudsman, Fin. Ombudsman Serv. (Jan. 8
& 9,2008).
209. See id.
210. See Walter Merricks, A Quarter-Century of Ombudsmen, OMBUDSMAN NEWS,
Apr. 2006, at 1, available at http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/
ombudsman-news/52/52.htm (stating that a fundamental principle of the FOS is that "the
ombudsman should operate on an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial basis").
211. SeeANNUAL REVIEW '08, supra note 190, at 43.
212. See id; Walter Merricks, Chief Ombudsman's Report, http://www.fmancial-
ombudsman.org.uk/ar03/arO3-chief.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2008). Of course, the details of
how "guided conciliation" operates depend on the individual adjudicator. In general, the
adjudicator will often first contact the party whom he or she believes has the nonmeritorious
claim and determine that party's willingness to accept that conclusion. See James & Morris,
supra note 8, at 179-80. In cases of resistance, the adjudicator may take more formal
measures to conciliate a resolution, often writing an adjudicator's report that lays out his or
her views of the proper resolution and sending it to both parties. See id. In broad terms,
then, this process of guided conciliation resembles the process of conciliation or evaluative
mediation that state regulators deploy in response to consumer complaints. See supm note 90
and accompanying text.
213. See SAMUEL, supra note 195; Walter Merricks, Chief Ombudsman, Fin.
Ombudsman Serv., Speech at the Financial Services Authority as Part of the Canary Wharf
Lecture Series: Is the Ombudsman Fair and Reasonable? (Oct. 28, 2004) [hereinafter
Merricks Speech] (explaining that the FOS "resolves disputes by examining written materials
submitted to us" and the "firm should send us the fruits of its own investigations, with its
files and the reason it rejected the complaint").
214. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
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Second, unlike complaint investigators in the United States, FOS
adjudicators focus solely on resolving consumer complaints and have
no regulatory authority. The FOS is formally independent from the
British insurance regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA)."5
As the FOS has put it: "[w]e make decisions on one-off individual
cases.., we do not carry out regulatory functions."2 '6 Of course, these
dividing lines are far from crisp, and the FSA and FOS must
consequently coordinate with one another and share information and
resources." 7 For instance, the FOS provides the FSA with its data,
which the FSA uses to help guide its market-conduct analysis. 8 The
FOS also makes firm-specific outcome data publicly available, as do
American insurance regulators."' Similarly, when adjudicators
encounter potential regulatory issues, they can formally refer them to
the FSA for investigation.22° Not only does the FOS assist the FSA in
its regulatory function, but the FSA also assists the FOS in dealing
with cases that have "wider implications" for the industry.2 '
215. See James & Morris, supra note 8, at 173-74. The FSA regulates all financial
services in the United Kingdom, including insurance. See Memorandum of Understanding
Between the Financial Services Authority (the FSA) and the Financial Ombudsman Service
(the FOS) (Apr. 6, 2007), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/mou/fsafos.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum
of Understanding]. While the FOS is primarily retrospective in its orientation, focusing on
resolving individual disputes that have already occurred, the FSA is primarily prospective in
its outlook, focusing on issues such as market stability, conduct, and structure. See id.;
ANNUAL REVIEW '08, supm note 190, at 42-45. However, the FSA does retain some control
over the FOS. For instance, it approves its budget and nominates some of its board members.
See James & Morris, supra note 8, at 173-74.
216. See FIN. OMBUDSMAN SERV., ANNUAL REVIEW AND REPORT & FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS: 1 APRIL 2005 TO 31 MARCH 2006, at 7 (2006), http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ar06/arO6-chair.htm.
217. See generallyGilad, supra note 187, at 914-17 (exploring the practical difficulties
that the FOS encounters in attempting to confine its role to dispute resolution rather than
regulation).
218. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 215.
219. Until recently, this data was not made public. This lack of transparency was
criticized in a recent independent review of the FOS. See Fin. Ombudsman Serv.,
Ombudsman Welcomes Lord Hunt's Report on "Opening Up, Reaching Out and Aiming
High" (Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/news/updates/Lordhunt-
Report.html. In response, the FOS announced that it would change its practice and make this
firm-specific data publicly available. See Fin. Ombudsman Serv., Policy Statement: Our
Strategic Approach to Transparency 38-39 (July 2008), http://www.financial-ombudsman.
org.uk/publications/policy-statements/transparency.html.
220. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 215.
221. The details of this exchange are described at a dedicated Web site, http://www.
wider-implications.info, which the FOS and FSA jointly maintain. Under the Wider
Implications process, any interested party, including the FOS, the firm, or the FSA, can argue
that a particular case at the FOS, or issue that the FOS deals with, involves wider
implications. Wider Implications, How Can a Wider-Implications Issue Be Raised?,
http://www.wider-implications.info/process/raising-wi.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2009). The
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Finally, unlike American regulators, who have no formal criteria
for determining how complaints that do not raise regulatory issues
ought to be resolved, adjudicators evaluate complaints in the course of
guided conciliation based on a "fair and reasonable" standard."' This
standard is defined by statute and requires the FOS to take into
account the "relevant law, regulations, regulators' rules and guidance,
relevant codes of practice and, where appropriate, what [the FOS]
considers to have been good industry practice at the relevant time."2
Adjudicators' primary source of guidance in applying this standard is
previous ombudsman decisions (described below)."4  These
ombudsman decisions and the specific subrules of the fair and
reasonable standard that they establish are available to adjudicators
through an extensive set of online materials, including a knowledge
tool kit that provides detailed information on various types of cases
with links to relevant ombudsman decisions. 5 While these materials
are not "binding" on adjudicators, they substantially influence
adjudicators' guided conciliation efforts.226 As a result, while the fair
and reasonable standard is clearly broad and flexible, it is often quite
specific in practice for adjudicators."7
relevant criteria for assessing whether to invoke this process includes whether it affects a large
number of consumers or businesses, the financial integrity of a business, interpretation of
FSA rules, or a common practice by businesses. Wider Implications, What Is a Wider
Implications Issue?, http://www.wider-implications.info/process/what is within (last visited
Feb. 10, 2009). When a case is deemed to involve wider implications, the FOS has discretion
to develop a consistent approach to relevant cases while the FSA addresses the issue. Wider
Implications, What Will the FSA, OFT and Ombudsman Service Do?, http://www.wider-
implications.info/process/what will be done.htm#2a (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
222. See James & Morris, supm note 8, at 184-88.
223. FSA HANDBOOK, supa note 193, § 3.6.4. The Financial Services and Markets
Act, 2000, c. 8, § 228(2) (Eng.), provides that a complaint must be assessed according "to
what is, in the opinion of the ombudsman, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the
case."
224. See Interview with Simon Coe, Head of Casework Div., Fin. Ombudsman Serv.
(Jan. 9, 2008).
225. MacNeil, supra note 179, at 520 (describing "internal FOS procedures" that help
to ensure consistency "though training, mentoring, and access to relevant source materials").
226. See Gilad, supm note 179, at 241-42.
227. See, e.g., Letter from Nigel Pope, Adjudicator, Fin. Ombudsman Serv., to Teresa
Fritz (Dec. 8, 2006) (on file with author) (describing the specific procedure for handling
Mortgage Endowment complaints and noting where it is available online). As Rawlings and
Willett describe, this basic principle has been employed to form more specific precedents.
See Rawlings & Willett, supra note 179, at 312-14. For instance, insurers are liable for
misstatements by their agents and are responsible for asking for material information. See id.
Much like certain versions of the reasonable expectations doctrine, the fair and reasonable
standard thus serves as a broad goal upon which more specific, and rule-like, doctrines are
constructed. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Expectatons Principle as a Regulative Ideal, 5
CONN. INS. L.J. 59, 61-62 (1998); Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 1427-30. Indeed, Rawlings and
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Adjudicator evaluations of a case, which are frequently generated
in the course of guided conciliations, generally describe the
background facts, reference relevant rules or procedures, and justify
the adjudicator's view based on factors such as policy language,
industry standards, and the consumer's reasonable expectations.228 All
factual disputes are resolved based on "the balance of probability" in
light of the available evidence. 9  Importantly, adjudicators do not
merely attempt to convince parties to accept their written evaluation of
a case: their efforts to conciliate settlements are much more fluid, and
often involve phone conversations, initial letters setting out their
preliminary view of a case, and efforts to convince either party to
230accept various concessions.
4. Stage Four: Ombudsman Review
If either party is unwilling to settle a case voluntarily through
guided conciliation at the adjudicator stage, then the matter proceeds
to ombudsman review. Ombudsman review strongly resembles
appraisal and external review, the prominent forms of state-facilitated
arbitration in the United States.3 Most notably, each of the six
insurance ombudsmen is legally empowered to bind insurers to pay
consumers up to £100,000.232 As in both external review and most
versions of appraisal, consumers can choose whether to use the ADR
process or sue in court after the dispute arises.2" Finally, like external
review and appraisal (as well as the earlier adjudicator stage),
ombudsman evaluations of a case are essentially inquisitorial rather
than adversarial.3
As with the other FOS stages, however, the ombudsman review
stage is distinctive from American versions of consumer insurance
Willett describe the fair and reasonable standard as a way of ensuring that the outcome should
match the "responsibility which the consumer-with no knowledge of insurance law-might
reasonably anticipate the insurer would bear." See Rawlings & Willett, supm note 179, at
313.
228. See, e.g., Letter from Nigel Pope, supa note 227.
229. See Fin. Ombudsman Serv., A Quick Guide to How We Handle Disputes
Between Businesses and Consumers (Aug. 2008), http://www.f'mancial-ombudsman.org.uk/
publications/technical notes/QG7.pdf.
230. See generallyANNUAL REvIEw '08, supra note 190, at 42; Gilad, supra note 179,
at 234-55; Interview with Ray Neighbour, Serv. Review Manager, Fin. Ombudsman Serv.
(July 15, 2008).
231. See supra Part lI.B.
232. See James & Morris, supra note 8, at 189. Insurers enjoy a limited right of appeal
to the courts when an ombudsman rules against them. See id at 175.
233. See id
234. See Merricks, supra note 210.
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arbitration in several important respects. First, ombudsmen's
authority is asymmetic: ombudsmen are only empowered to bind
insurers, not consumers.236 In other words, consumers are free to sue
their insurers for coverage regardless of the outcome of FOS review,
whereas insurers are bound to adhere to an ombudsman decision.
However, adverse ombudsman decisions are admissible in court
237
against a consumer.
Second, ombudsmen are public, high-ranking officials, whereas
American arbitrators are private contractors."' In that sense,
ombudsmen are closer to administrative law judges than to arbitrators,
even though they resolve disputes between private parties, rather than
between individuals and the government. Unlike either administrative
law judges or arbitrators, ombudsmen not only decide cases, but they
also help to administer the FOS. In the latter capacity, they help train
and monitor adjudicators, develop strategic plans for the FOS, and
create policy for the organization.239
Third, ombudsmen base their decisions in individual cases
predominantly on the paper materials that FOS adjudicators and call
center employees compiled at earlier stages of the process. This record
includes all papers relating to the case, such as the adjudicator's
analysis, the internal complaint, and any documents generated during
the conciliation process.24° Consequently, unlike any version of
American arbitration, ombudsmen have full access to earlier efforts to
conciliate a solution to the parties' dispute.24'
235. Like adjudicators, ombudsmen do not perform a regulatory role and only refer
matters to the FSA as a secondary portion of their job. See Memorandum of Understanding,
supra note 215. This, however, is not a distinction between the ombudsman review stage and
arbitration, which is also nonregulatory in orientation.
236. SeeMerricks, supranote 210, at 1.
237. Merricks Speech, supra note 213 ("[C]ourts are off-putting enough to most
consumers-even if they do not have a reasoned rejection from the ombudsman of their
complaint-that the judge would certainly see."); see, e.g., Tonkin v. U.K. Ins. Ltd., [2006]
EWHC (QB (TCC)) 1120, [134]-[145] (summarizing and adopting as a "sensible"
conclusion an adjudicator's decision, after the insured chose not to accept the adjudicator's
decision at the FOS and sued in court).
238. See James & Morris, supra note 8, at 174-75. The process by which ombudsmen
are selected (discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article) is described in James &
Morris. See id
239. See Fin. Ombudsman Serv., A Quick Guide to the Role and Work of Our Panel of
Ombudsmen (Nov. 2007), http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/technical-
notes/QG-ombudsman-panel.pdf; see also Gilad, supra note 179, at 241-42.
240. See Interview with Melissa Collett, supra note 208.
241. See id By contrast, a fundamental tenet of mediation in most American contexts
is that it is secretive, especially with respect to subsequent decision makers. See Reuben,
supm note 161, at 1280.
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Finally, like adjudicators, ombudsmen employ a "fair and
reasonable" standard in evaluating cases and writing their decisions.
Although this standard does not require ombudsmen to adhere to the
law when doing so would not serve justice, there are only a limited
number of domains in which ombudsmen affirmatively depart from
legal principles.242 When doing so, ombudsmen must correctly explain
the law and their rationale for departing from it.243 As such, "[w]hile
the fair and reasonable standard offers a potentially wide choice to the
Ombudsman in making a decision, it will be difficult to disregard the
law or regulatory rules which clearly 'bite' in the specific circum-
stances."24 Similarly, while the fair and reasonable standard does not
explicitly require ombudsmen to adhere to prior decisions,
ombudsmen effectively treat prior decisions as precedent that is
entitled to significant deference in resolving cases.245 Ombudsman
decisions resolve factual disputes based "on the balance of
probabilities '2 46 and are subject to narrow judicial review to determine
whether they contain legal or procedural errors or are "perverse and
irrational. 2 47  In a limited number of cases-including insurers'
allegations of consumer fraud and cases that raise difficult and novel
242. See Rawlings & Willett, supra note 179, at 312-14; Insurance Contract Law:
Misrepresentation, Non-Disclosure and Breach of Waranty by the Insured 70 (The Law
Comm'n, Consultation Paper No. 182 & The Scottish Law Comm'n, Discussion Paper No.
134, 2007), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp182-web.pdf [hereinafter
Insurance Contract Law]. The most notable examples where the FOS affirmatively departs
from the law involve nondisclosure and misrepresentation. See Insurance Contract Law,
supra, at 65-66 (describing ways in which FOS departs from law). These departures are
longstanding and reflect a near-consensus among British legal experts that certain substantive
areas of insurance law are unreasonably harsh when applied in the consumer sphere. See id.
at 71.
243. See R. in re Heather Moor & Edgecomb Ltd. v. Fin. Ombudsman Serv., [2008]
EWCA (Civ.) 642, [35], [49] ("[An ombudsman] is free to depart from the relevant law, but if
he does so he should say so in his decision and explain why.").
244. MacNeil, supra note 189, at 520.
245. Id
246. See, e.g., Letter from Heather Clayton, Lead Ombudsman, Fin. Ombudsman
Serv., to Teresa Fritz, Which? (Apr. 25, 2007) (on file with author).
247. See R. in re lFG Fin. Serv. Ltd. v. Fin. Ombudsman Serv. Ltd. [2005] EWHC
(Admin.) 1153, [13] ("[I]f [an ombudsman's] opinion as to what is fair and reasonable in all
the circumstances of the case is perverse or irational, that opinion, and any determination
made pursuant to it, is liable to be set aside on conventional judicial review grounds.")
(emphasis added)); R. in re Kenneth Green & Co. v. Fin. Ombudsman Serv., Ltd., [2003]
EWHC 338 (Admin.), [60] ("The [reviewing] court cannot quash a decision of an
[ombudsman] merely because it considers that a finding of fact by the [ombudsman] was
incorrect, or because ... the Court would have made a different assessment of the respective
merits .... ").
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legal questions-an ombudsman may decline to consider the merits of
a dispute because it is best suited for judicial resolution.248
In practice, ombudsman decisions resemble adjudicators' "views"
and "evaluations" of the case that are generated during guided
• ..• 249
conciliation. In part, this is because, as described earlier,
adjudicators use ombudsman decisions when they are attempting to
resolve cases.250 However, ombudsman decisions do tend to be more
legalistic than the materials produced by adjudicators in guided
conciliation, as most ombudsmen have some legal training.
Ombudsman decisions are sent to both parties, and abbreviated,
anonymous versions are published in a regular publication called
"Ombudsman News."
252
B. Comparing the American and British Approaches
1. The Similar Elements of Consumer Insurance ADR in the United
Kingdom and the United States
Although there are significant distinctions between the British
and American ADR schemes, their basic components are quite similar.
In both systems, publicly facilitated ADR is comprised of four basic
elements: (1) consumer complaints to insurers (internal complaints),
(2) initial complaint handling by a call center, (3) longer-term
conciliation, and (4) some version of arbitration. These stages are
diagrammed below. In the United Kingdom, these stages are unified
within a single umbrella organization, whereas they are more dispersed
248. See FSA HANDBOOK, supm note 193, § 3.3.4. There are numerous reasons that
the FOS can dismiss a complaint without consideration of the merits, including the belief that
the matter involves (1) a claim of fraud (which is hard to adjudicate on paper), (2) a novel
legal issue, (3) a reasonable application of commercial judgment, or (4) no material loss. See
id. § 3.3.4.
249. See, e.g., Letter from Heather Clayton, supm note 246; Letter from Melissa
Collett, Ombudsman, Fin. Ombudsman Serv., to Mrs. Cadd (Mar. 2, 2007) (on file with
author); Letter from Sue Wrigley, Ombudsman, Fin. Ombudsman Serv., to Anonymous (Aug.
16, 2007) (on file with author).
250. See Interview with Melissa Collett, supra note 208.
251. See JAMES, supra note 6, at 209 (describing "the dominance of the legal
profession amongst those appointed to the post of ombudsman").
252. See id; see, e.g., Fin. Ombudsman Serv., Ombudsman News, http://www.
fimancial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ombudsman.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2008)
(posting latest ombudsman news and describing various cases that the FOS resolved). Prior
to 1991, the IOB annual reports articulated general principles to serve as guidance to the
insurance community. See Gilad, supra note 187, at 912-14. This created some tensions,
because it appeared to move the IOB closer to being a regulator than a body for resolving
consumer disputes. See id. In response, the IOB moved to simply publishing anonymous
summaries of cases. Seeid.
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within the United States. Indeed, arbitration in the United States is
unrelated to the other three ADR processes and is only available for a
small subset of issues. These distinctions resurface later, but for now,
the basic point is that each of the FOS's constituent elements has a
direct analog in most American state systems.
ADR Structure (Figure A)
FOS American Consumer Insurance ADR
Internal complaints prerequisite to Internal complaints suggested prior to
FOS review regulator review; required prior to
external review
Call center receives complaint Regulator's call center receives
complaint
Adjudicators engage in guided Complaint handlers attempt to
conciliation to resolve case conciliate resolution of case
Review by ombudsmen, who are Appraisal/external review by private
public employees individuals
Not only are the basic elements of the FOS and American
schemes similar, but so too are a number of other features of the ADR
process, which are summarized graphically in Figure B. First, both the
FOS and many American schemes allow consumers to wait until after
a dispute arises before choosing between the available ADR options
and litigation. In the United States, such ex post consumer opt out is
common in both external review and appraisal as well as other
consumer insurance arbitration schemes, such as those involving no-
fault and Delaware's arbitration program."' It is also a centerpiece of
the Interstate Insurance Compact, as well as recently proposed federal
legislation on consumer arbitration provisions.254 This structure serves
as a consumer safeguard, ensuring that consumers will not be made
worse off by the ADR process than they are without it.255
253. See supma Part ll.B.
254. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Interstate
Insurance Product Regulation Commission Web Site, supra note 146.
255. Many American academics have endorsed this proposal. See BRUNET ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 182-83. Unlike consumers, insurers cannot opt out after a dispute arises in
any of these schemes. This makes sense: not only would such an opt out undermine any
authority of the ADR mechanism, but insurers are less in need of such protection, as ADR
generally poses less risk for repeat players. Some have argued against postdispute consumer
opt out, observing that consumers who have strong cases will choose not to pursue
arbitration. See Estreicher, supra note 4, at 567-68. This may be less of a problem in the
insurance context, given the significant discount rate of policyholders and their risk aversion.
See supra Part I.B. Moreover, this result would be no worse than the status quo.
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Second, in each ADR mechanism, the process is inquisitorial and
relatively informal. Recall that, like the FOS, both regulator-provided
conciliation and the two forms of state-facilitated insurance arbitration
are fundamentally inquisitorial, with a neutral third-party free to look
beyond the parties' arguments in scrutinizing the merits of the
dispute."' As stated above, this structure is a crucial feature in making
ADR truly accessible to uninformed consumers, who generally will
have little sense of how to frame or substantiate their complaints.257
Finally, both the FOS and most American consumer insurance
ADR mechanisms are free, or quite inexpensive, for consumers and
251
are predominantly funded by insurers. In many ways, the £450 case
fee that British insurers pay to the FOS is comparable to the costs that
insurers face when a consumer invokes external review: in both cases,
the insurer directly funds the ADR process regardless of the ultimate
outcome of the dispute. This once again significantly increases the
accessibility of insurance ADR, especially given that aggrieved
insurance consumers tend to be resource-constrained.259
Other ADR Features (Figure B)
FOS American Regulatory American Insurance
Conciliation Arbitration
Ex post consumer opt Ex post consumer opt out Ex post consumer opt
out out (common in
external review and
appraisal)
Service is free Service is free Fees are split
(appraisal) or
arbitration is free
(external review)
Inquisitorial, paper- Inquisitorial, paper-based Inquisitorial, paper-
based process process based process
While there are also some striking distinctions between the FOS
and American consumer-insurance ADR, even these are less
significant than they initially appear. Most notably, the asymmetric
256. See supra Part II.
257. See Interview with Walter Merricks, Chief Ombudsman, Fin. Ombudsman Serv.
(Jan. 8, 2008); supra text accompanying notes 174-177.
258. Regulatory complaint handling is free for consumers in all states, and the same is
generally true of external review. However, consumers must generally pay the costs of their
own appointed appraiser in appraisal. See supra text accompanying notes 128, 141.
259. See supa Part I.B.
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authority of the FOS-which allows policyholders to litigate a case
even if an ombudsman rules against them"6 -is perhaps the most
"radical" element of the FOS process for Americans. This consumer
protection device is designed to ensure consumers that they will not
lose anything by seeking FOS review. But in practice, this protection
is largely illusory, as consumers virtually never invoke their "litigation
option."26' There are a variety of reasons for this fact. First, punitive
damages are much less common in the United Kingdom than in the
United States and have historically been unavailable in breach of
contract cases, including insurance claims disputes.262 Consequently, it
is difficult to find British attorneys who will take an insurance
coverage case on a contingency fee basis. Second, Britain's loser-pays
fee-shifting rule enhances the riskiness of litigation for consumers.263
Third, the British courts have historically been quite anticonsumer in
insurance contexts.2" Finally, and most significantly, consumers'
supposed right to litigate even if an ombudsman rules against them is
significantly undermined by the fact that an ombudsman's adverse
decision is generally admissible in court against a consumer.265
2. The Different Results of Consumer Insurance ADR in the United
Kingdom and the United States
The individual pieces of the FOS process, therefore, resemble our
own internal complaint, conciliation, and arbitration procedures for
consumer insurance disputes. This Subpart shows that, despite these
similarities, the FOS has enjoyed far greater success than the American
ADR schemes. In fact, the FOS performs remarkably well along each
of the dimensions in which American ADR schemes falter.
First, the FOS has had dramatically more success than American
regulators in quickly conciliating voluntary resolutions to insurance
disputes. Recall that, as a rough approximation, American regulators
260. See supra text accompanying note 236.
261. Merricks Speech, supra note 213 ("Few commentators suggest that consumers
should be bound by the ombudsman-perhaps for the reason that very few of the consumers
whose cases we reject then exercise their right to take their dispute to court."). But cf
Merricks, supra note 210, at 1 (stating that a fundamental principle of the FOS is that
"consumers should not lose their legal rights by complaining to the ombudsman").
262. Andrew Tettenborn, Pun'tive Damages-A View from England 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1551, 1552 (2004).
263. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule
Discourage Low-Probability-of-PrevailingPlantiffs9 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 141 (1998).
264. See Rawlings & Willett, supra note 179, at 312; Insurance Conftct Law, supra
note 242, at 65-66.
265. See supra text accompanying note 237.
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successfully convince insurers to compromise voluntarily in less than
half of all confirmed consumer complaints.2 " By contrast, the FOS
convinces parties to voluntarily settle their insurance disputes in
guided conciliation, without seeking ombudsman review, approxi-
267
mately ninety-four percent of the time. Of course, these percentages
are not directly comparable. The FOS settlement figure reflects all
complaints to the FOS, which are resolved in favor of consumers in
one-third to one-half of insurance cases, depending on the relevant line
of insurance.2 68 The United States settlement figure, by comparison,
reflects only "confirmed complaints" where the regulator has "upheld
the consumer position.' '269 It may be easier, or harder, for the FOS to
convince losing consumers to settle than it is for regulators to convince
insurers who are the subject of confirmed complaints to compromise.
Additionally, the methodology for generating these two figures
differs.7 Nonetheless, the gap in settlement rates is at least a rough
reflection of the relative effectiveness of the two different conciliation
programs.
Second, the FOS better maintains neutrality than American ADR
schemes, even though its jurisdiction is not limited to cases in which
this neutrality is easiest to ensure. The best evidence of this neutrality
is the support that the FOS enjoys from competing constituencies.
Insurers voluntarily created the FOS's predecessor almost three
decades ago,27' and their enthusiasm for it has not waned in the
266. See supm text accompanying notes 97-101.
267. See Simon Coe, Serv. Manager of the Assessment Unit, Fin. Ombudsman Serv.,
Presentation 9, 14-15 (Jan. 10, 2008) (presentation slides) (on file with author). Forty percent
of insurance cases are assigned to an "assessment team" that resolves insurance cases
voluntarily 96.2% of the time, whereas 60% of insurance cases are assigned to an
"investigation team" that resolves insurance cases voluntarily 92.6% of the time. The
resulting 94.01% settlement rate in insurance is almost identical to the larger voluntary
settlement rate at the FOS. See ANNUAL REVIEW '08, supra note 190, at 1 (reporting 90%
settlement rate); FIN. OMBUDSMAN SERV., ANNUAL REVIEW: FNANCIAL YEAR 2006/07, at 1
(2007), available at http://www.fmancial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ar07/ar07.pdf
[hereinafter ANNUAL REVIEW '07] (reporting 94% settlement rate).
268. SeeANNuAL REVIEW '08, supranote 190, at 44.
269. Compare COMPLAINT DisPosmoNs, supm note 84, at 1, with ANNUAL REVIEW
'08, supra note 190, at 1. The reason for this discrepancy is that consumers do not have any
options within the ADR system when a regulator informs them that their complaint is without
merit. Consequently, it is impossible to determine whether or not the consumer "voluntarily"
accepts this resolution of the case.
270. In particular, whereas the success rate for FOS conciliation is based simply on
whether either party seeks ombudsmen review, the settlement rate for state regulators is based
on examination of the individual "disposition codes" that regulators assign to complaints.
Compare ComPLAtNT DisPosrroNs, supm note 84, at 1-2, with ANNUAL REVIEw '08, supra
note 190, at 1.
271. See supm text accompanying notes 183-185.
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interim: a 2007 survey, conducted by the British Insurance
Association, reported that 88% of British insurers are "satisfied with
the relationship they have with the FOS," 87% believe the roles of the
FOS and FSA are "reasonably clear," 94% support the use of the "fair
and reasonable" standard, and 75% believe that the role of the FOS
should not change dramatically.
72
Perhaps even more importantly, this enthusiasm for the FOS is
shared by consumers and consumer groups. Among consumers who
complain to the FOS, 70% believe that the FOS "handle[s] complaints
efficiently and professionally," and only 12% disagree . 273 This positive
impression of the FOS was held not only by consumers who felt they
had "won" their complaint (with 86% reporting that they were
satisfied with the FOS), but also by those who believed they "lost"
their complaint (48% of whom were satisfied with the FOS).274 One of
the primary consumer rights groups in Britain, Which?, similarly
promotes the FOS, noting that it "provides an effective alternative to
the court system which levels the playing field between firms and
consumers.'" 275  Another major consumer group, the National
Consumer Council, opines that "the FOS continues to do a good job
under difficult circumstances" and makes its "service[s] accessible to
users."
276
Finally, two independent assessments found that the FOS's
process for evaluating consumer complaints is generally impartial.
The first, conducted in 2004 by the Personal Finance Research Centre
272. SeeAss'n of British Insurers, Survey of Members' Experience and Perceptions of
the Financial Ombudsman Service 3-4 (Jan. 2008) (on file with author).
273. ANNUAL REVIEW '07, supra note 267, at 60. Favorable consumer ratings of the
FOS should not necessarily be equated with evidence of a well-functioning dispute resolution
process. As Sharon Gilad has argued, much of what the FOS does is to "manage" consumers'
expectations and communicate with them in a way that engenders their trust and satisfies
their emotional needs. See genemlly Gilad, supra note 179, at 244-45. Favorable consumer
perceptions of the FOS may be driven more by this focus on effective communication with
consumers than by the underlying quality of the dispute resolution process.
274. ANNUAL REVIEW '07, supm note 267, at 61.
275. See Which?, Consultation Response Regarding the Hunt Review 2 (Jan. 22,
2008), available at http://www.thehuntreview.org.uk/submissions/submissions.html; see also
Interview with Teresa Fritz, Principal Researcher, Which? Money Research Group (Jan. 10,
2008).
276. See Nat'l Consumer Council, The Hunt Review Response to the Call for
Evidence to the Independent Review of the Financial Ombudsman Service by Lord Hunt of
Wirral MBE 4, 6 (n.d.). The National Consumer Council has opined, more generally, that
"[p]rivate sector ombudsmen have delivered significant benefits to consumers for a
generation" and "seem generally to work well." See STEVE BROOKER, LESSONS FROM
OMBUDSMAN1A 3 (2008), available at oparchive.org/tna/20080804145057/http://www.ncc.
org.uk/nccpdf/poldocs/NCC 198ft ombudsmania.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
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at the University of Bristol, concluded that the FOS provides a
"robust" "fair" "reasonable," "flexible," and "efficient" process for
resolving consumer complaints."' A more recent independent report
struck a more critical tone, noting that the FOS "can seem intimidating
and unwelcoming to the less educated" and that it is sometimes
perceived to "make[] it up as it goes along."'278 Nonetheless, the report
repeatedly lauds the FOS's "independence from industry, regulators
and consumer bodies" and the "impartial nature of its internal
processes. 279
In contrast to the FOS, each of the American schemes reviewed
in Part II raise significant questions about third-party neutrality, with
the concerns being so significant in the arbitration context that states
generally refuse to promote arbitration outside of narrow factual
disputes over valuation and medical necessity determinations. 28 The
FOS, by contrast, succeeds in maintaining its neutrality, even though
its jurisdiction extends to all types of insurance complaints (and
beyond).28 ' Unlike many neutrality-promoting procedural safeguards
in arbitration,282 the FOS's neutrality does not unduly sacrifice speed or
efficiency: the FOS resolves over half of all disputes within three
months.283
The FOS accomplishes this with roughly the same amount of
resources that American insurance regulators devote to dispute
resolution. For instance, the number of FOS employees who work on
insurance disputes is quite similar to the number of American
regulators who focus on resolving insurance disputes. The FOS has
about 119 adjudicators who work on insurance matters and about six
insurance ombudsmen.284 Approximately fifty-five additional FOS
277. See ELAINE KEMPSON, SHARON COLLARD & NICK MOORE, FAIR AND
REASONABLE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE 24, 40-41 (2004),
available athttp://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publicafions/pdf/kempson-report-04.pdf.
278. THE HUNT REVIEW: OPENING UP, REACHING OUT, AND AIMING HIGH (2008),
available at http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/news/updates/LordHunt-Report.html
(download "Lord Hunt's report").
279. Id. at 15, 21, 24, 27.
280. See supm Part II.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 190-191.
282. See Estreicher, supra note 4, at 159.
283. See ANNUAL REVIEw '08, supra note 190, at 47. These numbers exclude "mortgage
endowment cases;' which involve interest-only mortgages that are coupled with an
endowment policy to which payments are made. See id; Fin. Serv. Auth., How Mortgage
Endowments Work (May 4, 2007), http://www.moneymadeclear.fsa.gov.uk/news/product/
endowments/howmortgage endowmentswork.html. Such endowments have not been used
in American markets.
284. See Coe, supra note 267, at 9, 14-15.
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employees, such as call center staff and support staff, can be allocated
to the insurance function of the FOS, resulting in a total of about 180
FOS insurance employees."5 By contrast, there were 1723 total
employees in state consumer affairs divisions in 2006, 540 of which
were complaint investigators and 213 of which were supervisory
staff.
286
Of course, precise comparison of these figures is impossible.
First, the two countries are different sizes: the United States has about
three times the total insurance premium income as the United
Kingdom287 and about five times the total population of the United
Kingdom.' Second, American consumer affairs divisions perform
regulatory functions in addition to complaint conciliation. 2  A rough,
but generous, estimate is that consumer affairs divisions spend half of
their time on regulatory activities that are separate from complaint
processing and resolution.29° These two considerations suggest that
direct comparison requires multiplying the number of FOS employees
by anywhere from six to ten, resulting in an adjusted figure of roughly
between 1080 and 1800 FOS employees who work on insurance. This
compares well to the 1723 regulatory complaint handlers in the United
States, especially as the United States estimate does not include
resources that are devoted to insurance arbitration, while the FOS
figure reflects the similar process of ombudsman review.
The caseloads of FOS and American complaint handlers are also
roughly comparable to one another. FOS insurance adjudicator
2911
caseloads are approximately 160 to 200 cases a year. By contrast,American complaint investigators have caseloads of about 400 to 600
285. The FOS has about 825 employees, and its insurance caseload is about 17 to 22%
of its total cases, resulting in somewhere between 140 and 180 FOS employees that can be
roughly allocated to the insurance function of the FOS. See supra text accompanying notes
190-192. The estimate in the text uses the most conservative estimate of 180 FOS employees
dedicated to insurance.
286. RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 67, at 11.
287. See Ass'N OF BRMSH INSURERS, supra note 182, at 3.
288. See U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB) Country Summary:
United States, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country/usportal.html (last visited Nov.
16, 2008); U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB) Country Summary: United
Kingdom, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www.idb/country/ukportal.htmI (last visited Nov. 16,
2008).
289. See supra Part II.
290. Half of responding insurance departments reported that the primary purpose of
their Consumer Affairs Divisions is to "assist consumers in a time of crisis" rather than to
"investigate violations of the law." See Consumer Services Survey, supra note 67, at 23.
291. SeeCoe, supra note 267, at 9, 14-15.
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cases a year, on average."' This discrepancy, while significant, is less
than it may initially appear. Compared to the FOS, a higher
percentage of consumer calls to American regulators are mere
"inquiries" as opposed to "complaints." '93  Inquiries are much less
time-intensive than complaints. While adjudicator case figures do not
reflect any inquiries (which are dealt with by the consumer call center),
regulator caseload figures often do, because complaint investigators
directly receive consumer calls in many (but not all) states.'
IV EXPLAINING THE COMPARATIVE SUCCESS OF THE BRITISH PRIVATE
OMBUDSMAN MODEL
Part III raises a puzzle. Given that so many of the basic building
blocks of the FOS resemble insurance ADR programs used in the
United States, why is the FOS so much more successful than its
American counterparts? This Part proposes an answer to that puzzle
that focuses on the comparative institutional architecture of the two
ADR schemes. The structure of the FOS, Part IV argues, blends
elements of the uncoordinated insurance ADR mechanisms used in the
United States, most notably regulator-conciliation and arbitration.
Other nonstructural elements of the FOS facilitate the smooth
operation of this conglomerate. While the constituent elements of the
FOS scheme only differ marginally from individual state insurance
ADR schemes, these pieces are thereby deployed within an
institutional architecture that creates multiple synergies.
The FOS's blending of ADR elements takes place along at least
three dimensions. First, Subpart A argues that the FOS's combination
of independent ADR approaches-including insurer-policyholder
negotiation, regulator-provided conciliation and state-regulated
arbitration-into a single coordinated scheme facilitates an ADR
292. See supra text accompanying note 83.
293. American regulators receive almost 400,000 complaints and 2.5 million
consumer inquiries a year, meaning that only one out of every 7.25 calls is a complaint rather
than an inquiry. RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 67, at 11. The FOS handles about 94,000 to
163,000 insurance complaints and inquiries a year. ANNUAL REVIEW '07, supa note 267, at
1; ANNUAL REVIEW '08, supra note 190, at 1. Only about 16,000 to 27,000 insurance cases,
or one in six consumer contacts, become formal "cases" that are reviewed by adjudicators.
ANNUAL REVIEW '07, supra note 267, at 1; ANNUAL REVIEW '08, supra note 190, at 1.
Although many calls do not become cases because they are inquiries, others do not become
cases for other reasons: a consumer has not lodged an internal complaint, or the complaint
can be resolved quickly. See ANNUAL REVIEW '08, supra note 190, at 13. But even if every
call that did not become a complaint was an inquiry, this would still mean that one out of
every six calls was a complaint rather than an inquiry.
294. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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process that is as broad and accessible as conciliation, while remaining
as effective and cost-efficient as state-regulated arbitration. It explores
how the FOS's ultimate authority to issue binding decisions in the
"arbitration" stage has disproportionate trickle down effects that
improve the efficacy of earlier, cheaper ADR stages. Subpart B, in
turn, contends that the public, but independent, status of the FOS
blends private arbitration with the public facets of regulator-sponsored
conciliation. Once again, this unusual intermediate position helps the
FOS to overcome problems endemic to ADR in America. The FOS's
public and unitary status allows it to manage effectively the problem of
decision-maker bias while its independence from the regulator
counteracts problems associated with the dual identity of regulator-
conciliators. Finally, Subpart C explores how the FOS's unique
"reasonable fairness" standard blends formal doctrinal precedent with
informal industry norms and equitable principles in a way that
facilitates the FOS's efficient operation.
A. The FOS' CoordinatedADR Process
A fundamental principle of effective dispute system design is that
most disputes should be resolved by aligning the interests of the
competing parties.29  Only when this proves impossible should
disputes be decided based on which party is "right."'2 96 Finally, only
where both an interests-based and rights-based approach proves
impossible should the relative power of the parties dictate who
prevails.297 The explanation for this tiered approach is simple: "in
general, reconciling interests is less costly than determining who is
right, which in turn is less costly than determining who is more
powerful" 298
295. WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRET-r & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETrING DISPUTES
RESOLVED 15 (1993); see also Peter Robinson, Arthur Perlstein & Bernard Mayer, DyADS
Encouraging 'Dynamic Adaptive Dispute Systems" in the Organized Workplace, 10 HARv.
NEGOTr. L. REV. 339, 360-64 (2005) ("As much as possible, a [Dynamic Adaptive Dispute
System] should allow and encourage parties in conflict to make decisions and resolve
conflicts on the basis of needs and interests.").
296. URY, BRETT &GOLDBERG, supra note 295, at 15.
297. Id.
298. Id. In many ways, this dynamic approach to dispute resolution resembles
"responsive regulation." See LAN AIRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION
(1992). The idea behind responsive regulation is that enforcement sanctions should start out
as relatively nonintrusive and gradually become more severe as needed. Throughout the
process, regulators should engage in a dialogue with the regulated entities to encourage
compliance. See id. Like tiered dispute resolution, responsive regulation attempts to devote
only as much resources as need be to generate the desired outcomes. The key difference, of
course, is that responsive regulation and tiered dispute resolution must operate differently
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The FOS employs this tiered approach for resolving consumer
insurance disputes by combining ADR elements-including
negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration-into a single coordinated
scheme. Each successive stage of the FOS process presents a new
opportunity for policyholder complaints to be resolved in a way that is
one degree further along the "interests-rights-power" spectrum. For
instance, strictly requiring that consumers lodge their complaints with
insurers prior to initiating a complaint with the FOS 99 helps to ensure
that all complaints that are susceptible to voluntary settlements are
resolved in that fashion. Similarly, funneling all cases through the
adjudicator/conciliation stage before the ombudsman/arbitration
stage °° helps ensure that only the cases where the parties' interests are
least aligned reach the ombudsman stage °  Finally, a tiny minority of
cases-those presenting novel legal issues or factual issues beyond the
capacity of the FOS to assess-are left unresolved by the rights-based
ombudsman stage, subject to the power struggle of litigation.
This ADR structure is an important, if unremarkable, feature of
the FOS. In many respects, it resembles the multidoor courthouse
proposed by Frank Sander more than three decades ago. 3 What is
remarkable, however, is the way that the FOS implements this tiered
approach to ADR resolution. The FOS process is structured so that the
authority that exists later in the process, during the rights-based
ombudsman/arbitration stage, exerts significant pressure on the earlier
stages. Consequently, many disputes that would require significant
resources to resolve in an uncoordinated model are resolved through a
relatively cheap, interests-based form of ADR, such as negotiation or
conciliation, under the FOS model. This trickle-down effect of
ombudsman authority helps explain the fact that at each of the FOS's
because of the differences in the underlying enterprises of regulation and dispute resolution.
See infa text accompanying notes 370-371.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 193-199.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 207-226.
301. This happens most often with cases that raise systemic issues. SeeSharon Gilad,
Juggling Conflicting Demands: The Case of the UK Financial Ombudsman Service, 19 J.
PUB. AtDMIN. RES. & THEORY (forthcoming 2009) ("High ratios of firms' appeals for an
ombudsman's review were typically associated with the FOS's handling of new influxes of
complaints of a systemic nature.").
302. See supra text accompanying note 248.
303. Sander proposed that disputes be routed by a multidoor courthouse to dispute
resolution mechanisms that best suited the dispute. See Frank A.E. Sander, Varieties of
Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE
84 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979); see also Jeffrey Stempel, Reflections on
Judicial ADR and the Multi-door Courthouse at Twenty Fait Accompl Failed Overture, or
FledglingAdulthood?, 11 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 297 (1996).
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stages, a significant majority of disputes-between eighty and ninety-
five percent-are resolved.3 4 The authority that exists at the end of the
FOS structure is thus a central ingredient to the organization's success
because it enhances the effectiveness of each of the earlier stages. The
FOS's creative use of this authority allows it to transcend the trade-off
between accessibility and affordability, on the one hand, and
effectiveness, on the other, which seems embedded in American ADR
approaches to consumer insurance.
This Subpart teases these ideas out with respect to each stage of
the FOS process. It shows how the FOS's coordination of individual
ADR approaches significantly enhances the effectiveness of the
relatively cheap stages, and contrasts that effectiveness with the largely
uncoordinated, though similar, ADR approaches used in American
consumer insurance ADR. Because the FOS's coordination operates
by allowing later, more expensive ADR stages to influence earlier,
faster and cheaper stages, the analysis below proceeds in reverse, with
the later links in the FOS chain examined first.
1. FOS Conciliation in Light of Ombudsman Authority
The FOS combines the interests-oriented approach of regulator-
conciliators and the authority-based approach of arbitrators in a way
that allows it to be roughly as cost efficient and accessible as the
former while remaining as effective as the latter. As Part Ill makes
clear, FOS adjudicators are roughly comparable to regulatory
complaint investigators and have similar (though perhaps slightly
lighter) caseloads. °5  Yet they convince parties to resolve their
insurance disputes voluntarily about ninety-five percent of the time,
compared to the roughly fifty percent settlement rate of American
regulators."6
This effectiveness in conciliating settlements at the adjudicator
stage is vital to the FOS's success. As described above, voluntary
settlement through interest alignment involves comparatively low
transaction costs.' °7 For instance, the vast majority of cases that are
handled by FOS adjudicators never reach ombudsman review and are
resolved relatively quickly-usually within three months.08 These
facts are central to the entire FOS scheme, given that ombudsmen are
304. See supm text accompanying notes 266-270.
305. See supm text accompanying notes 291-294.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 266-270.
307. See URY, BRETr & GOLDBERG, supra note 295, at 15.
308. SeeANNuALREVIEW '08, supra note 190, at 47.
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significantly more scarce resources than adjudicators and that speedy
payments are a key concern for policyholders.3 9 Apart from these
efficiency considerations, such interest-based dispute resolution is
particularly likely to result in the mutual satisfaction of the parties. '10
The primary reason that FOS adjudicators enjoy a higher
settlement rate than their American counterparts is that their
conciliation efforts are linked to the subsequent ombudsman stage, the
FOS's version of arbitration. This link exists on several independent
levels. First, adjudicators' assessments of cases, which help to frame
the conciliation process, strongly resemble ombudsman decision
making. This is because adjudicators are trained by ombudsmen, seek
advice from ombudsmen on individual cases, learn from ombudsmen
over time, and use ombudsman decisions to help conciliate cases."'
Because ombudsmen have the dual roles of deciding individual cases
and training and advising adjudicators, ombudsmen also help to shape
an institutional culture that impacts the decision making heuristics and
instincts of individual adjudicators."2 The link has real results: as the
FOS explains, "[y]our adjudicator will have seen many very similar
cases before-and will have a very good idea of how the ombudsman
would be likely to view your case."3 '3
This link in the decision-making processes of adjudicator/
conciliators and ombudsmen/arbitrators significantly enhances the
effectiveness of conciliation. Insurers and consumers are generally
willing to accept adjudicators' framing of disputes during conciliation
precisely because appealing to an ombudsman will not typically
change the outcome, but will result in increased delay, costs, and stress
to both parties. Insurers, of course, learn this fact from experience.
31 4
And adjudicators communicate this link between the conciliation
process and ombudsman review to consumers as well: they inform
consumers that adjudicators' assessments are highly predictive of
309. See Interview with Simon Coe, supra note 224.
310. Seeid
311. See Gilad, supra note 179, at 232-33, 241 (describing the training of adjudicators
by ombudsmen and noting that adjudicators were "encouraged to seek an ombudsman's
advice before issuing their decision whenever" they were unsure about an issue); Interview
with Simon Coe, supra note 224; Interview with Ray Neighbour, supra note 230.
312. See Interview with Walter Merricks, supra note 257.
313. Fin. Ombudsman Serv., Information for Businesses Covered by the Ombudsman
Service (Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/faq/businesses/answers/
decidecasesa2.html.
314. See Interview with Ray Neighbour, supra note 230.
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ombudsmen's decisions and explain the rationale for their view based
on FOS source materials.1 5
A second link between adjudicator/conciliation and ombudsmen/
arbitrators is that both are part of a structure that has the authority to
bind insurers. Even if ombudsmen frequently overturned adjudicators'
decisions, the mere fact that adjudicators are part of an organization
that can definitively resolve consumer complaints (at least those under
£100,000) affords them significantly more credibility than their
American counterparts, regulator-conciliators.3 " This is particularly
true with respect to consumers. A large body of work in psychology
shows that when individuals perceive a dispute resolution process to be
procedurally fair, they are more likely to accept the results and,
correspondingly, less likely to appeal those decisions. 3 " Disputants are
more likely to view ADR processes as procedurally fair when they
have a chance to participate personally in the process and
communicate with the decision maker."' Because adjudicators are
part of an organization with the authority to resolve consumer
disputes, FOS complainants often feel that they have this "voice" in
the ADR process once a complaint goes through the adjudicator
stage.319
The third, and final, link between the adjudicator and
ombudsman stages of the FOS process is that, when deciding cases,
ombudsmen have access to all papers relating to the case, including
materials generated during the earlier conciliation process.320
Moreover, insurers that seek ombudsman review typically must
explain in writing why they are doing so.32' Especially for insurers,
who are repeat players, ombudsmen can use this information to assess
315. See, e.g., Letter from Simon Chong, Adjudicator, Fin. Ombudsman Serv., to
Anonymous (Aug. 18, 2005) (on file with author) ("[Y]ou may ask for an ombudsman's
decision[, but] I should tell you I consider that unless you are able to provide any further
evidence or arguments, an ombudsman's decision is unlikely to differ from what I have said
above.").
316. See Interview with Ray Neighbour, supra note 230.
317. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 81-82 (1988); Laurens Walker, E. Allan Lind & John Thibaut, The
Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REv. 1401, 1402-03 (1979).
318. LIND &TYLER, supra note 317, at 100-05.
319. See generallyGilad, supra note 179, at 232-35 (detailing the various strategies of
the FOS in attempting to satisfy the emotional needs of complainants, and thus convince
them not to appeal to an ombudsman). One way that FOS adjudicators seek to give
complainants voice, and thus avoid an appeal to an ombudsman, is by "quoting an
approximation of the complainant's statements on the complaint form." Id. at 235.
320. See Interview with Melissa Collett, supra note 208.
321. Seeid
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whether parties are seeking ombudsman review because they have
legitimate disagreements with adjudicators, or whether they are simply
doing so as a matter of course.322 In the latter situation, the
ombudsman can refer the firm to the Financial Services Authority
(FSA) for regulatory investigations."' Perhaps more importantly, such
firms will inevitably develop a reputation within the FOS that may
well affect how future cases are handled.
Ultimately, then, the ombudsman/arbitration stage of the FOS
significantly influences the earlier adjudicator/conciliation process
even though, as is usually the case, neither party ever invokes it. In
this way, FOS adjudicators are cloaked with quasi-authontiybecause of
the links between their conciliation/evaluation and the authority of
ombudsmen to render decisions that are binding on insurers. This
quasi-authority significantly enhances settlement rates from
conciliation. Additionally, it improves consumer confidence in the
insurance industry by giving consumers a relatively accessible and
independent option for determining whether their insurer has treated
them fairly.
324
To be sure, this quasi-authority has its costs, as it may undermine
the benefits of interest alignment described above.32' Most notably, it
allows adjudicators to discourage consumers from seeking
ombudsman review even when the adjudicator is wrong about the
underlying merits of the case. Such misguided pressure may create its
own repeat-player advantage for insurers, who are comparatively well-
equipped to assess the relative quality of an individual adjudicator's
assessment.326 Additionally, consumers who accept an adjudicator's
determination that their complaint is without merit may not feel the
sense of resolution that often accompanies interest alignment.23
322. See Gilad, supra note 301 ("[The FOS] was inclined to invoke the threat of
passing information to the FSA when uncooperative firms persistently challenged
adjudicators' decisions by appealing for ombudsmen's reviews with regard to a large number
of similar complaints.").
323. See id. (noting that the FOS followed through on such threats).
324. See Stempel, supa note 90, at 214 (arguing that evaluative mediation helps
inform parties of their background legal rights).
325. See discussion of Ury, Brett and Goldberg, supra text accompanying notes 295-
298.
326. Ultimately, though, this problem is limited given how infrequently ombudsmen
actually overturn adjudicators' decisions.
327. See supa text accompanying note 310 (indicating that voluntary settlement is
more likely to produce mutual satisfaction in results). But cf supra text accompanying notes
271-272 (referencing data that complainants to FOS report high level of satisfaction).
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This quasi-authority of FOS adjudicators is a striking contrast
with regulator-conciliation in the United States, which is generally
completely untethered from any rights-based decision-making
process."8 Unlike FOS officials, American regulatory conciliators
must generally rely entirely on aligning the parties' interests in order to
convince them to resolve a case voluntarily. But, most significant
insurance coverage disputes are zero-sum games: the consumer's
primary interest is in the payment of the claim, while the insurer's
primary interest is in not paying the claim. Moreover, the insurer will
often have very little interest in preserving the relationship, as the
insured's loss (as well as her willingness to complain) provides prima
facie evidence that she is a "bad" risk. As the literature on ADR has
long recognized, aligning the interests of such competing parties is
generally quite difficult.329 These facts may help to explain the
comparatively poor settlement rate of American regulator-
conciliators.33° They also contribute to the inability of American
policyholders to assess whether their insurer has handled a claim
fairly.
331
Admittedly, regulator-conciliators may be able to align the
interests of insurers and policyholders in ways that FOS adjudicators
cannot by leveraging their regulatory authority to induce settlement.332
For instance, a regulator-conciliator might suggest that an insurers'
refusal to compromise may lead to heightened regulatory scrutiny in
the future.333 Ultimately, though, the use of regulatory leverage to align
interests is more likely to harm the bargaining dynamic than to help it
because so few consumer complaints actually implicate regulatory
328. See supm Part II.A.
329. See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 8-15 (1975) (explaining that mediation is often impossible when
the parties have "noncorrespondent outcomes," meaning that for one party to win, the other
must lose); URY, BRETr & GOLDBERG, supm note 295, at 16 ("In some disputes, the interests
are so opposed that agreement is not possible.")
330. See supm notes 97-101 and accompanying text (discussing poor settlement rates
of insurance conciliation by state insurance departments).
331. See supm text accompanying note 30.
332. Of course, there are other cases in which regulators can, and do, align the
interests of consumers and insurers. This is particularly likely in small value cases or cases in
which the reputational consequences to the insurer of denying coverage are significant. As
Part I suggests, ordinarily the reputational impact of a claims denial will be less for an insurer
than the value of denying the claims. See supra text accompanying notes 24-30. But this is
not always true. For instance, cases that attract significant media coverage may invert the
ordinary calculus. This may well be why the success rate of insurance mediation in mass
disasters is so high. See supm text accompanying notes 100-101.
333. Such threats of future regulator action are described in Serber, supra note 5, at
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issues. In 2007, complaint handlers referred only 0.4% of confirmed
consumer complaints to their market conduct divisions, and in 2006
the percentage was even smaller.334 Complaint handlers' implicit or
explicit threats of such regulatory action are therefore unlikely to prove
credible. In fact, they may be counterproductive: insurers facing
threats of regulatory action may be less willing to compromise in
response to a consumer complaint, fearing that such compromise may
be used against them in a subsequent regulatory action.'335
2. The Call Center and the Case Fee
A second way that the FOS leverages the later, more involved
ADR stages to facilitate early and efficient resolution of disputes is
through the case fee that its call center levies on insurers. As described
above, once a complaint is elevated to an adjudicator, the consumer's
insurer is charged a £450 case fee.336 This structure not only provides
the FOS with funding, but it allows call center employees to convince
insurers to settle cases before the case fee is levied against them. It is
therefore partly responsible for the significant percentage of calls that
are "weeded out" at this stage of the FOS process: in most years, only
one out of every six calls to the call center results in a full-blown case
that reaches an adjudicator.37 This narrowing of calls that turn into
cases not only promotes early-stage resolution of disputes, but it avoids
the direct involvement of both ombudsmen and adjudicators. It thus
contributes to the comparatively low caseload of adjudicators, as
compared to American regulator-conciliators.338
As with the adjudicator stage, early dispute resolution by the call
center uses the later, more expensive stages of the tiered FOS process
to facilitate early resolution of cases. Because the FOS conducts both
early- and late-stage ADR, call center employees can leverage the
expense that exists later on in ways that would otherwise be
impossible. Although regulator-conciliators may ordinarily focus
334. COMPLAINT DISPOSITIONS, supra note 84, at 1.
335. See Gilad, supra note 301 ("Firms resisted informal conciliation of complaints
when concerned that their agreement to redress an individual complaint might be interpreted
by the regulator or the media as entailing compensation awards to a large number of other
customers in similar circumstances.").
336. See supra text accompanying note 205.
337. Gilad, supra note 301; ANNUAL REVIEW '07, supra note 267, at 1. There are a
number of other reasons that calls are not elevated, including that no internal complaint was
filed, the call was clearly not meritorious, or the call was merely an inquiry. ANNuAL REVIEW
'08, supra note 190, at 13.
338. See supa text accompanying notes 291-294.
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insurers on the potential costs of litigation, those costs are always
hypothetical for insurers because their refusal to compromise may not
necessarily lead to litigation."' By contrast, because FOS call center
employees impose the case fee, they can guarantee reluctant insurers
that failure to compromise early will result in subsequent ADR costs.
Like FOS adjudicators, and unlike American regulator-conciliators,
FOS call center employees thus enjoy a quasi-authority in attempting
to convince insurers to settle cases early.4
In fact, the distinctions between the FOS and American schemes
run even deeper. American insurers do indeed pay for the dispute
resolution services of regulators, but they do so indirectly, through
premium taxes.14' Because the amount of taxes that insurers owe is not
influenced by how often their particular consumers complain to
regulators, insurers have no incentive to use the common resource of
regulator-facilitated conciliation judiciously by resolving cases quickly.
The FOS avoids this "tragedy of the commons" by forcing insurers to
internalize the costs of resolving disputes with their policyholders.
This provides British insurers with an incentive to avoid consumer
complaints in the first place and to settle those complaints quickly
before the imposition of a case fee.
3. The Internal Complaint Process and Subsequent FOS Review
Finally, the various links between firms' processing of internal
consumer complaints and subsequent FOS review once again use the
FOS's tiered and interconnected design to promote cheap and effective
dispute resolution. Recall that all consumer complaints must be
lodged with the underlying firm before a consumer can initiate the
FOS process. 342  Firms are statutorily required to investigate and
respond to internal complaints, and these responses form the basis of
the FOS's subsequent evaluation of the case.343 Informal estimates
suggest that consumers who lodge internal complaints seek FOS
339. See generally Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies,
8 LAw & PoL'Y 7, 13 (1986).
340. This pseudo-authority may be similar to the authority that Minnesota regulator-
conciliators possess by virtue of their capacity to link quick complaint resolution with public
disclosure. See supra text accompanying note 95.
341. Randall, supra note 114, at 643 (explaining funding of state insurance depart-
ments).
342. See supra text accompanying note 193.
343. This is true of review for both adjudicators and ombudsmen. See supra text
accompanying notes 213-214, 239-241.
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assistance between two to ten percent of the time.344 This internal
complaint resolution obviously reduces the number of complaints that
reach the FOS, and may be one of the reasons why FOS adjudicators
enjoy lighter caseloads than their American counterparts.345
Once again, the effectiveness of insurers' internal complaint
handling in the United Kingdom is significantly enhanced by the
FOS's tiered ADR process. Because firms' internal complaint files
form the basis of subsequent FOS review of complainants' cases,
firms have a natural incentive to take this process seriously.3 46 First, a
deficient internal complaint file will prejudice a firm's case if it ends
up at the FOS. Second, it may cause the FOS to refer the matter to the
FSA for regulatory action and tarnish the firm's larger reputation
within the FOS.347 The FOS can thus promote effective regulation of
the internal complaint-handling process precisely because adjudicators
and ombudsmen review these files in the ordinary course of resolving
disputes.
Encouraging insurers to investigate and process consumer
complaints more carefully has the potential to improve insurers'
resolution of consumer disputes. Insurers may incorrectly deny a
claim and subsequently reject consumer complaints because they rely
on a claims-handling bureaucracy whose members may be encouraged
(directly or indirectly) to keep payments low and profit high. 48 Even
insurers who instill in their employees a culture of upholding claims in
cases of doubt must nonetheless "proceed[] by routinizing and
simplifying [the] inherently complex and difficult procedures" of
344. See Gilad, supm note 301 (noting that no formal statistic is available, but
reporting her own estimate based on interviews with FOS employees); Merricks Speech,
supra note 213 ("In most classes of business, one might hope that firms would resolve all but
a tiny minority of complaints-leaving perhaps between 2% and 5% to be referred to the
ombudsman."). A comparative figure for American regulators is difficult to estimate, as
internal complaints may not be recorded, aggrieved insurance consumers often pursue legal
recourse without consulting regulators, and there are only sporadic requirements that insurers
inform consumers about their right to complain.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 291-294.
346. See Interview with Adam Samuel, Complaint Handling Consultant (Jan. 7, 2008).
347. See SAMUEL, supra note 195, at 676-77 (discussing fines for inappropriate
complaint handling, but suggesting that the regulator has not been sufficiently aggressive on
this front, as one firm was "notorious" for its complaint handling "for many years in
Ombudsman circles which had repeatedly asked regulators to take action").
348. See BAKER, supra note 14, at 54-55, 106 (quoting Hayseeds Inc. v. State Farm
Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73, 78-79 (W. Va. 1986)) (noting that "the vast majority of insurance
claims are resolved according to the insurance law of the insurance adjustor" and exploring
the competitive pressures that may be placed on such adjustors).
2009]
TULANE LA W REVIEW
claims handling.34 9 The United Kingdom's experience suggests that
forcing insurers to disentangle the jobs of claims handlers and
complaint handlers could help to limit the prospect that an intransigent
insurance claims bureaucracy would stand in the way of resolving
legitimate consumer complaints.350
Of course, as described above, state regulators do make nominal
efforts to link the internal complaint process and the regulatory
complaint process. They often request that consumers first contact
their insurer with complaints, and insurers are subject to some minimal
regulation of their internal complaint handling process.351' But outside
of the realm of health insurance, these links are too weak to create any
real incentive for insurers to take internal complaint handling seriously
because, unlike with the FOS, the results of that complaint handling
are not generally incorporated into subsequent dispute resolution.352
Nor could they be: insurers are free to ignore oral complaints, they
need not provide written responses to any complaints, and their
responses to consumer complaints that are lodged with the regulator
need not relate to any prior analysis of the complaint.353
B. The Role of the Regulator and Pivate Parties in Dispute
Resolution
The second structural way in which the British scheme
successfully melds the two ADR approaches used in the United States
is by relying on a nonregulatory, public organization to handle
disputes. Unlike American states, in which insurance regulators
double as conciliators, FOS complaint handlers are largely
independent of the British insurance regulator. At the same time, the
FOS does not rely on fragmented private decision makers as in
American insurance arbitration. Instead, the FOS is a unitary, public
entity. The FOS's organizational structure therefore straddles the two
options that currently exist for the ADR of consumer insurance
disputes in the United States. This intermediate position allows the
349. H. LAURENCE Ross, SETrLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 135 (1970).
350. See JAMES, supm note 6, at 205-07. Although the benefits of internal review are
"not clear cut" because some firms have poor internal complaint mechanisms, in general the
"development of internal procedures has been one of the additional benefits flowing from the
... ombudsman scheme" as most complainants will have their complaint "satisfactorily
resolved" internally. Id.
351. See supm text accompanying notes 71-76.
352. See generallyPart II.A.
353. Seeid
798 [Vol. 83:735
CONSUMER DISPUTE RESOLUTION
FOS to maintain its neutrality, promote the cooperation of disputants,
and ensure that regulatory issues are appropriately addressed.
1. The FOS's Independence from the Regulator
The FOS's independence from the British Insurance regulator, the
FSA, contributes significantly to its success.114 Most importantly, this
separation enhances the FOS's independence. The primary tasks of
insurance regulators are to ensure insurers' solvency and examine
insurers' market conduct for regulatory violations.355 Each of these
tasks requires affirmative engagement with the industry, meaning that
regulators' independence from insurers is often impossible, and
perhaps even undesirable."'
By contrast, housing complaint handlers in their own separate
organizational setting promotes a culture of independence. First, it
facilitates the ability of lead officials to develop such a culture
internally, because of the organization's unity of purpose.357 Thus, FOS
ombudsmen consistently emphasize to adjudicators, call-center
employees, and other FOS staff the centrality of the FOS's
independence and neutrality.58 By contrast, a regulator would have
difficulty promoting this message, given the close relationship
between regulators and industry.35 9 Second, a complaint organization's
354. See supra text accompanying note 215.
355. See generallyETTLINGER ETAL., supra note 36.
356. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1684-85 (1975) (noting widespread acceptance of the notion that capture
often results from innocuous repeat interactions between regulators and the subjects of that
regulation). Given the necessity of dialogue between industry and regulators and the
simultaneous risk that that can lead to capture, some have argued that regulators who handle
solvency and systemic risk concerns should be separated from those who deal with consumer
protection issues. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Cre&t Safer, 157 U. PENN.
L. REv. 1 (2008); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Consuming Debt.- Structuring the Federal
Response to Abuses in Consumer Cre&4 18 LoY. CONSUMER L. REv. 43, 48 (2005); Adam J.
Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream 15 (Sept. 7, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/events/
userfiles/file/workshops/Fal12008/Levitin%2OWorkshop%2OPresentation.pdf ("The safety-
and-soundness mission is incompatible with consumer protection because practices that
might be profitable and thus increase banks' safety-and-soundness might also be abusive and
unfair to consumers.").
357. Interview with Walter Merricks, supra note 257 (opining that the FOS is able to
instill in its employees an ethos of resolving cases fairly and independently because that is its
central mission).
358. See id; Gilad, supra note 187, at 911 (describing the ombudsman's frequent
emphasis on the individualized and case-specific nature of FOS work).
359. See JAMES, supra note 6, at 220-21 (describing how "the ombudsman's
independence may be compromised by, for example, subtle and unacknowledged pressure
from ... those within the industry concerned" and suggesting that this may happen when
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lack of regulatory authority allows its employees to articulate their role
clearly to consumers, insurers, and other stakeholders. Indeed, FOS
communications to consumers repeatedly explain that the purpose of
the FOS is simply to resolve disputes fairly, and not to punish
360wrongdoers. Over time, this message tends to become a self-
fulfilling prophecy, with employees embracing the message of
independence that they describe to outsiders.6
This culture of independence makes complaint handling
organizations such as the FOS less susceptible to some of the problems
that plague American regulator-conciliators. For instance, faced with
resource constraints, the FOS seeks to streamline its dispute resolution
process rather than to set it aside completely (as do some regulators).362
This might entail standardizing the resolution of certain types of
complaints or encouraging firms' cooperation by assuring
confidentiality.3 63  Similarly, because the FOS defines itself by its
independence, its employees are probably less likely to "deselect"
cases based on nonneutral principles than American regulator-
conciliators.364
The FOS's independence from the regulator also facilitates
industry cooperation by decreasing insurers' fear that settling
individual cases will trigger enhanced regulatory scrutiny. Although
the FOS reports patterns of complaints or complaints raising systemic
issues to the regulator,365 it is "not in the business of shopping [firms]
to the regulator for minor things" and will tend to refer only "matter[s]
that instinctively call[] for ... regulatory intervention. '  As a result,
ombudsman are selected by "a regulatory body closely linked with the industry"); James &
Morris, supm note 8, at 174 ("[T]oo intimate a relationship with the regulator can raise
questions about the genuine independence of the ombudsman."); Interview with Teresa Fritz,
supra note 275 (suggesting that the FOS can maintain its neutrality because, unlike the FSA,
it does not affirmatively scrutinize market actors and is merely responsive to consumer
contacts).
360. See, e.g., Letter from Heather Clayton, supra note 246.
361. See Gilad, supra note 187, at 911 (arguing that the FOS's frequent emphasis on
the individualized and case-specific nature of its work, which was designed to avoid being
perceived as a regulator, created a self-reinforcing trend).
362. See supra text accompanying notes 102-113.
363. See Gilad, supra note 301.
364. Compare supra text accompanying notes 114-117, with Gilad, supra note 301, at
19 (explaining that the FOS was motivated to avoid inconsistency in its decision making,
especially as firms would often track FOS decisions in order to detect potential
inconsistencies). Of course, such misfeasance is possible at the FOS as well. But the FOS
has relatively robust methods for identifying nonneutral decision making. See infa text
accompanying notes 393-398.
365. See supra text accompanying note 220.
366. Gilad, supra note 301, at 13 (quoting FOS executive).
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insurers are reportedly more willing to compromise in individual cases
because they need not fear that their regulator will interpret such
compromise as a concession of improper behavior.67 By contrast, it is
possible that insurers in the United States are hesitant to settle
individual cases through regulatory-facilitated conciliation because
they fear that admitting a mistake will make them "look bad" to their
regulator.368
Undeniably, there are a number of potentially significant
drawbacks to disaggregating complaint handling and regulation.
Perhaps the most significant cost is the potential for regulators and
complaint handlers to develop conflicting views, leading to uncertainty
in the industry. Indeed, the FOS and FSA do not always coordinate
well and the FOS is often criticized for acting as a regulator rather than
an adjudicator.369 While a number of formal channels exist to address
these issues,370 they are imperfect. Ultimately, though, the conflicts
that stem from disentangling the jobs of complaint handlers and
regulators can be managed because the roles of regulators and
complaint handlers are fundamentally different. Regulators attempt to
avoid abstract problems that may occur in the future while complaint
handlers attempt to resolve specific problems that have occurred in the
past. Indeed, the fact that insurance regulators handle consumer
complaints is attributable largely to historical accident as opposed to
thoughtful institutional design.371
A second cost to disentangling complaint handling and regulation
is that regulators often rely on consumer complaints to help guide their
market conduct analysis.3 72 Even if a complaint handling entity were
required to report systemic issues or patterns of complaints to a
regulator, as the FOS is, the complaint handling organization might be
less adept than the regulator at identifying these regulatory problems
367. See Interview with Harriet Quiney, Partner, Fishburns Solicitors (Jan. 10, 2008)
(opining that big firms would worry more about resolving cases if the FOS were a branch of
the regulator, as they would be cautious about revealing facts that might prejudice them, even
if they did not implicate regulatory issues); Interview with Linda Smith, Policy Team
Manager, Ass'n of Indep. Fin. Advisors (Jan. 11, 2008) (suggesting that the FOS's
independence from the regulator limits insurers' perception that any concession or error could
be used against them in subsequent regulatory actions).
368. See supra text accompanying note 335.
369. See Gilad, supra note 187, at 917 (describing "firms' allegations that the
ombudsman was inappropriately assuming the role of a regulator").
370. See supra text accompanying notes 216-221.
371. See Whitford & Kimball, supra note 5, at 661-67.
372. 1 NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, MARKET REGULATION HANDBOOK (2008) (on
file with author).
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from complaint data."' Additionally, individual adjudicators may have
an incentive to refrain from referring firms to the regulator in order to
increase their willingness to compromise in individual cases. 7' Indeed,
these hypotheses are arguably consistent with firms' reported
decreased fear of regulatory scrutiny as a result of compromising with
the FOS.
Although legitimate, these drawbacks are limited and appear to
strike an effective balance between facilitating regulation and
promoting compromise. First, the actual impact on market conduct
analysis of indirectly funneling complaint data to the regulator, rather
than allowing the regulator to collect that data on its own, is
speculative and requires further study. Second, although substantial
fluctuations in consumer complaints can alert regulators to significant
regulatory issues, consumer complaints are ultimately only a blunt
instrument for guiding market conduct analysis. As noted earlier, a
remarkably small percentage of complaints are referred to regulators'
market conduct divisions.75 And consumers of a particular insurer
may be more likely to complain to a regulator for a variety of reasons,
only some of which suggest a regulatory issue. 76 For these reasons,
regulators might be better off if they focused their market conduct
analysis on insurers' internal complaint records rather than complaints
made directly to their offices.
2. The FOS as a Public Entity
Despite its formal separation from the regulator, the FOS does
not utilize individual, private decision makers as in American
arbitration. The FOS is a unitary public entity and, as with insurance
regulators, it is operated entirely by public employees.3 77 Like many
segments of the American government, the FOS is thus a state-run
373. This might be true if, for instance, regulators are better able to identify regulatory
issues from complaint data than a complaint handling organization such as the FOS.
374. See Gilad, supra note 301 (finding mixed evidence of such negotiations).
375. See supra text accompanying note 84.
376. For instance, the insurer could clearly refer disgruntled consumers to the
regulator, or the insurers' policyholders might tend to be relatively sophisticated, and thus
likely to lodge complaints, due to the insurers' underwriting strategy.
377. The idea of publicly provided ADR was first promoted by Frank Sander. See
Frank A.E. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 65-87 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds.,
1979); see also Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI.
L. RE. 494, 536 (1986). Sander's call for a "multidoor courthouse" largely envisioned the
judiciary providing this ADR role, however. See Sander, supra, at 65-87. By contrast, the
FOS is independent from the British judiciary.
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provider of ADRF, 8  despite its categorization as a private
ombudsman.379 This structure helps avoid a number of well-known
pitfalls from privatizing the ADR of consumer disputes.
First, as discussed earlier, arbitrators may tend to favor repeat
players such as insurance companies because they depend on them for
business and develop relationships with them over time)8 ° A unified
public body such as the FOS can monitor the independence of its
employees to prevent this repeat-player advantage. Indeed, the FOS
goes to great lengths to assure the independence of individual
adjudicators: case files are randomly checked each month by a quality
assurance team; ombudsmen directly review adjudicator case files in
the course of their own review; and adjudicators' claims-resolution
patterns are tracked to identify statistical anomalies."' Where
consumers believe that an adjudicator or an ombudsman is biased, they
can lodge a complaint with an "independent assessor," who considers
the propriety of the FOS employee's behavior (but not the merits of the
underlying complaint), and where appropriate, orders the FOS to pay
redress.3"2  Moreover, because the individual adjudicators and
ombudsmen who deal with a case are not chosen by either party and
no competing private entities provide this service, there is no
opportunity for repeat players to select sympathetic decision makers.
This system of internal checks on employees' behavior is far superior,
and easier to implement, than the regulation of independent,
autonomous, private arbitrators.383
As noted above, the FOS's public status also allows it to identify
and address complaints that raise broad regulatory issues. By contrast,
insurance arbitration can suppress information about insurers'
practices, limiting both consumer knowledge and regulatory
378. See generally Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute
Resolution andAdjudication, 10 OHIo ST. J. ON Dis. RESOL. 211, 214 (1995) (describing the
increasing use of ADR mechanisms by various elements of the federal government and
arguing that "ADR has become an integral part of the state's mechanisms for responding to
disputes").
379. As explained earlier, a private ombudsman resolves disputes between private
parties, and it need not itself be a private entity. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
380. See supra text accompanying note 160.
381. See Gilad, supra note 179, at 244 ("Managers conducted an intensive random
quality assurance review of adjudicators' decisions ... "); Interview with Ray Neighbour,
supra note 230.
382. ANNuAL REVIEW '08, supranote 190, at 74-77.
383. See supra text accompanying note 169 (noting limitations of monitoring and
regulating private decision makers for neutrality); cf Stempel, supra note 165, at 260-64
(advocating for regulation and licensing of arbitrators).
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scrutiny.384  A unitary public entity such as the FOS cannot only
identify regulatory issues much better than independent arbitrators, but
it can coordinate with the regulator to handle these situations
cooperatively.11
Finally, a unitary, public complaint handling entity provides
greater transparency than a system of private adjudicators. Private
decision makers will inevitably use different and potentially conflicting
approaches for resolving cases, which can indirectly exacerbate the
repeat-player advantage.386  By contrast, a unitary, public entity can
more easily assure consistency through internal monitoring,
communication among decision makers, and dissemination of
decision-making criteria, as described below.387
C The Reasonable Fairness Standard
A final way in which the FOS scheme blends elements of the
various insurance ADR approaches used in America is through its
decision-making criterion of "reasonable fairness." In certain ways,
the reasonable fairness standard resembles ordinary law: its content is
developed in publicly available ombudsman decisions that develop
over time and are subject to limited judicial review. In other ways,
though, the reasonable fairness standard more closely resembles broad
equitable principles that tend to inform conciliation and some forms of
arbitration: it is flexible, focuses on fairness, and does not constitute
binding precedent for future cases. 38 9 This strategic combination of
two alternative approaches once again harnesses many of the benefits
of each approach while limiting their pitfalls.
The legalistic characteristics of the fair and reasonable standard
help mitigate some of the problems that vex consumer ADR in the
United States. First, the publication of ombudsman decisions
explaining and applying the fair and reasonable standard39° enhances
the consistency of FOS decision making in the same way as legal
precedent, by providing a baseline against which future cases should
be compared. This helps to offset both the "deselection" that can
384. See supa text accompanying note 161.
385. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 215.
386. See supra text accompanying note 171.
387. Gilad, supa note 301 (describing each of these efforts at coordinated decision
making and the way in which multiple FOS stakeholders monitor adherence to such
consistent decision making).
388. See supra text accompanying notes 222-226, 242-245.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 222-226, 242-245.
390. See supra text accompanying note 252.
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occur in regulator-conciliation and the alleged "lawlessness" of
insurance arbitration."' It also limits the repeat-player advantage of
insurers, who tend to benefit from inconsistency, which allows more
room for them to "game the system."'3 92 Additionally, publication of
ombudsman decisions provides guidance to the industry about its
practices3 93 and ensures that the content of the fair and reasonable
standard is subject to public scrutiny and accountability"
Second, the role of precedent in ombudsman decisions also
harnesses core benefits of the legal process. Recall that while
ombudsmen are not legally bound by their earlier decisions,
ombudsman decisions often use analogical reasoning to apply or
distinguish previous opinions and must demonstrate an awareness of
the law under the "perverse and irrational" standard of review.3 95 As
with judicial precedent, this process facilitates consistency over time
and across cases, but can nonetheless evolve to address novel
situations.396 It also produces decisions that reflect the collective views
of multiple experts, which are generally much wiser than any
individual expert's analysis.397 Finally, it constrains the authority of
ombudsmen by forcing them to articulate their decisions in written
form based on predefined rules398
At the same time, the nonlegalistic elements of the reasonable
fairness standard provide the FOS with important benefits that would
be undercut by the use of a strictly legalistic standard. Because the
standard is not subject to formal binding precedent and is broad and
grounded in common sense, FOS adjudicators who are generally not
391. See supra text accompanying notes 114-117, 160.
392. See supra text accompanying note 160.
393. A recent survey of British insurers found that "one-half [of respondents] think
anticipation of future FOS rulings impact upon business decisions." Ass'n of British
Insurers, supra note 272, at 4; see also JAMES, supra note 6, at 216 ("Decisions made in
individual cases may provide a body of informal case law which can affect the way in which
those within an industry formulate policy and design procedures.").
394. SeeFin. Ombudsman Sere., supra note 252.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 242-245 (describing the role of precedent in
ombudsman decisions applying the fair and reasonable standard); Financial Services and
Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 228(2) (Eng.); JAMES, supra note 6, at 216.
396. See generally O.W HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881); Emily Sherwin,
A Defense ofAnalogical Reasoning hm Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1179, 1189 (1999); Cass R.
Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 745 (1993).
397. See generally JAMES SuROwIECmu, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY
ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND How COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BuSINESS, ECONOMIES,
SOCETIES, AND NATIONS (2004) (arguing that groups of people are collectively smarter than
individuals under certain conditions).
398. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDtES 372-98 (1989).
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legally trained can apply it with reasonable success.399 They need not
analyze traditional legal sources or even rigorously distinguish or apply
prior ombudsman decisions to do so." Rather, they can explain their
decisions in layman's terms, guided by a relatively simple set of sub-
rules and principles that are explained to them in their training
materials and online resources, and which are themselves based on
ombudsman decisions.4"' In this way, the fair and reasonable standard
operates as a vehicle through which ombudsmen translate a relatively
sophisticated standard into a more tractable set of principles and rules
that can be implemented by less specialized bureaucrats.
42
V FROM THEORY TO REALITY: TOWARDS A PRIVATE INSURANCE
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE UNITED STATES
The FOS's success suggests several straight-forward reforms that
could easily be accommodated within the United States' existing
consumer insurance ADR structures. For instance, state insurance
departments could be authorized to collect case fees, 43 arbitrators'
decisions could be published and publicly disseminated, 40 4 and
399. See Interview with Walter Merricks, supra note 257 (explaining that adjudicators
do not need to be lawyers to apply the fair and reasonable standard accurately).
400. See supra text accompanying notes 222-226 (describing adjudicators' application
of the fair and reasonable standard).
401. See Gilad, supra note 179, at 232 ("Interviewees maintained that complaints were
usually straightforward from a professional stance, involving simple and recurrent issues.")
402. In many ways, this is similar to the way in which the law of negligence is
translated into a set of rules of thumb that insurance adjustors use to settle cases. See Ross,
supra note 349, at 134-35 (describing how vague standards such as negligence are translated
into concrete rules of thumb by insurance companies in order to manage the volume of
claims that claims handlers must deal with).
403. See supra text accompanying notes 336-341. State legislation could easily permit
insurance departments to collect individual case fees from insurers for resolving their
customers' complaints. Armed with this authority, insurance departments that have a two-
stage conciliation process wherein initial calls are answered by one employee, and
subsequent conciliation efforts are taken up by a second employee-could make payment of
the case fee contingent on the insurer's refusal to settle at the first conciliation stage. See
supra text accompanying note 81. In fact, such a scheme would simply be one variation on
Minnesota's procedure of excluding from insurers' complaint ratio disputes that insurers
quickly resolve. See supra text accompanying note 95.
404. Lawmakers could follow the FOS and require that insurance arbitrators publish
their decisions and make those decisions available to regulators. As noted earlier, arbitrators
in other fields, such as labor and employment, already publish their decisions as a matter of
course. See supra text accompanying note 161. In fact, California already requires
arbitrators in medical service agreements to issue a written decision that must be provided to
the insurance department and made publicly available upon request. See CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1373.21 (Deering 2008).
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insurers' internal complaint handling rules could be strengthened.4 5
To be sure, each of these incremental reforms would probably
help to improve consumer insurance ADR in America. But simply
cherry-picking individual elements of the FOS scheme that can easily
be mimicked within our own institutional framework misses the larger
lesson that the private ombudsmen model offers. No single policy or
practice accounts for a significant percentage of the FOS's success.
Rather, it is the FOS's institutional architecture that explains the stark
discrepancies in outcomes between the American and British systems
for resolving consumer insurance disputes. This architecture
coordinates the different stages of ADR and leverages the FOS's
ultimate authority in order to promote settlement at each of the earlier
4061 iasstages. It also ensures the FOS's neutrality, while promoting
dialogue and communication with regulators, industry, and
407
consumers.
Indeed, many of the nonstructural reforms described above
contribute to the FOS's success precisely because they support and
complement the organization's institutional structure. For instance, the
rules governing insurers' internal complaint handling promote early
settlement in the United Kingdom because of the way they fit within
the larger FOS framework. The FOS's regular review of internal
complaint files in the course of resolving disputes and its authority to
bind insurers to adverse outcomes both help to ensure that firms take
seriously the internal complaint handling process.408  Similarly, the
publication of ombudsman decisions helps to promote a coherent, and
consistent, standard of review in part because of the FOS's larger
institutional framework. Such consistency would be quite difficult
were ombudsmen not part of a single organization that actively
promotes an institutional culture of neutrality, independence, and
fairness.409
Although the FOS model may offer few "quick fix" policy
reforms, the big-picture structural lessons that it does offer are less
405. State regulators could easily improve the rules governing insurers' internal
complaint handling. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76. They could expand the
definition of a complaint and require insurers to provide written explanations to such
complaints within a specified time period. These responses could then automatically form
the basis of any subsequent conciliation by the regulator. See supra text accompanying notes
193-199.
406. See supra Part IVA.
407. See supra Parts IVB-C.
408. See supra text accompanying notes 342-353.
409. See supra text accompanying notes 354-376.
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daunting than they may initially appear. Because so many of the
constitutive elements of the FOS resemble ADR approaches that are
already used in American insurance contexts, implementing an
American scheme based on the FOS would merely involve rearranging
existing ADR pieces rather than funding and developing those pieces
out of whole cloth. For instance, an interested jurisdiction could begin
simply by removing part of the consumer affairs division from its
insurance regulator and hiring several attorneys or insurance experts
who might otherwise be arbitrators. Some of the legal infrastructure
for this new entity could be borrowed from the rules that already
govern external review and appraisal. These might include regulations
governing internal review of complaints, when parties must submit
documents for review, and when (and if) they can request a hearing.
Of course, these sources might provide limited guidance in a few
areas, and here policymakers could turn to the provisions of the
Financial Services Markets Act that created the FOS in 2000.
American jurisdictions could adopt these basic elements of the
FOS scheme without embracing its most politically untenable
elements. For instance, an American scheme could employ an
ombudsman/arbitration stage that was binding on both consumers and
insurers, rather than only binding on insurers. As discussed earlier,
such an approach might be necessary given the differences in the
background insurance law regimes of the United Kingdom and United
States"1 In particular, the potential for punitive damages in the United
States could cause successful applicants to an American private
ombudsman that did not bind consumers to try their luck in litigation,
leading to duplicative resources being devoted to the dispute resolution
411process.
The legal obstacles to such reform would likely be minimal. The
United States Constitution does not mandate any particular procedure
for resolving disputes. As long as each party is afforded meaningful
notice and opportunity to be heard, "a state may choose the remedy
best adapted, in the legislative judgment, to protect the interests
concerned.' '4 2 For this reason, even a scheme that replicated the FOS's
410. See supra text accompanying notes 261-265.
411. This would be an extreme form of the problem with consumer opt out identified
by Estreicher and others. See supra text accompanying note 255.
412. See Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158
(1931); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 80 (1972). Applying this principle in Hardware, the Supreme Court upheld Minnesota's
appraisal requirement for fire insurance policies. 284 U.S. at 158. The FOS has itself been
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asymmetric authority to bind insurers, but not policyholders, would
likely survive challenge.413 Similarly, an FOS-like scheme would pose
few state constitutional problems. Although the jury trial rights of
state constitutions have proven to be a major obstacle to tort reform,414
they would not interfere with an FOS scheme. Consumers would face
no deprivation of their jury trial right as long as they could opt for
litigation after the dispute arose, as is the case with the FOS .
Insurers would similarly have no viable jury-trial claim. Because they
are "affected with a public interest" insurers are routinely subject to
regulation that might otherwise impair constitutional rights. 4 1 6 Just as
insurers do not suffer an unconstitutional taking when their rates are
regulated, they would not be deprived of their jury-trial right by
417
regulation of their claims dispute resolution process.
By contrast, the political obstacles to reform based on the FOS
are likely to be significant. As Howell Jackson has demonstrated,
political differences help to explain why the United Kingdom was so
much more successful than the United States in radically modernizing
its financial regulation in the late 1990s.41 1 Political differences might
likewise render an FOS-like scheme politically infeasible in the United
States. In particular, the United States has an entrenched culture of
"adversarial legalism" which includes lawyer-dominated litigation to
challenged on Due Process grounds. See Paul McMillan, FOS Says lts Flavour of the Month
for Legal Challenges, MONEY MARKETING, Oct. 5, 2006, at 8.
413. The asymmetry would not pose any obvious Due Process concerns, as both
insurers and consumers retain a meaningful right to be heard. See George Rutherglen, Better
Late Than Never Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.YU. L.
REv. 258, 266 (1996) (noting that no Due Process challenge was ever levied against the old
"one-way intervention" class action procedure, wherein class members could "benefit from a
favorable judgment but escape the preclusive effect of an unfavorable judgment").
414. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW (3d ed.
2007).
415. A fundamental element of the right to a jury trial is that it can be waived. A
postdispute opt out may not even be necessary to accomplish waiver. Some courts have held
that consumers can waive their jury-trial rights voluntarily simply by signing an insurance
policy, rejecting "contract of adhesion" arguments. See, e.g., Meyer v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 582 A.2d 275, 276-78 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). As argued above, though,
consumer opt out is essential for consumer protection reasons. See supm text accompanying
notes 253-255.
416. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 406-88 (1914); see also
O'Gorman &Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257 (1930).
417. See German Alliance, 233 U.S. 389.
418. See Jackson, supm note 180, at 7 ("The highly decentralized structure of
traditional financial regulation in the United States creates numerous constituencies inclined
to resist any efforts to make major changes in regulatory structures.").
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resolve disputes.4"9 This culture would clash directly with an FOS
scheme that sought to move dispute resolution into a more
bureaucratic and inquisitorial setting.
Despite these difficulties, there are reasons to believe that an FOS
scheme could prove politically viable in the United States. First, and
most importantly, because the states currently regulate insurance, only
a single state must be convinced to embrace an FOS-like scheme.
Once a state did so, others could observe the results and adopt it if it
proved successful. Moreover, a private ombudsman could be offered
at the federal level, in tandem with one of the new federal insurance
regulatory schemes that have been proposed in recent months.4" In a
climate where a new federal insurance regulator is being designed
from scratch, supplementing it with an FOS-like scheme would have
no impact on entrenched agencies or procedures.'
Second, the British experience suggests that the insurance
industry-the most significant potential opponent of an FOS-like
approach--could be convinced to endorse such a scheme. Indeed,
British insurers overwhelmingly support the FOS as a valuable
mechanism for enhancing consumer confidence in the industry.422
Thus, the British Insurance Association, after surveying its members,
found:
The industry perceives that the FOS plays a key role in providing
consumers with a complaints resolution service that is free to the
consumer, easy to understand and non-legalistic in its approach. This
helps underpin consumer confidence in financial services and avoids
lengthy court processes that would add to costs.
423
Part of the reason for this industry support is that the FOS helps to
manage "the public's excessive or unrealistic expectations" of coverage
by "communicating adverse decisions to complainants in a sensitive
419. See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY
OF LAW 4 (2001) ("[A]dversarial legalism is deeply rooted in the political institutions and
values of the United States. Americans are not likely to accept wholesale replacement of
familiar legal rights and practices by legal institutions drawn from rather different political
traditions.").
420. E.g., Scott, supra note 6.
421. But see Jackson, supra note 180, at 6-10 (suggesting that entrenched agency
powers were a significant impediment to more substantial financial reform in the late 1990s,
whereas the British avoided this infighting in the design of the FSA by providing "guaranteed
continuity of employment for all regulatory personnel over the course of the consolidation
process").
422. See supra text accompanying note 372.
423. SeeAss'n of British Insurers, supranote 272.
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and persuasive manner" that emphasizes its "independence from
firms.
4 24
Finally, the evolution of the FOS in the United Kingdom
demonstrates that legislative mandate is not the only way in which
such a scheme could develop. Rather, it was the insurance industry in
the United Kingdom that forged the private ombudsman approach.
Accounts of insurers' motivations for doing so differ.425 But at least
one contributing factor seems to have been the prospect of legislative
action if the industry did not itself act.426 American lawmakers could
similarly design inducements, both positive and negative, to encourage
insurers to cooperatively design their own private ombudsman.
Alternatively, because a privately operated scheme would have some
drawbacks, lawmakers could experiment with trying to induce insurers
to comply voluntarily with a state-run private ombudsman scheme. In
either case, lawmakers might, for instance, consider allowing insurers
to avoid bad-faith claims as an inducement to action. States without a
bad-faith doctrine could do the opposite, threatening to adopt such
rules in the absence of an FOS-like approach.427  In the end, the
potential that more effective ADR could both mitigate litigation costs
and buttress consumer confidence makes the prospect of such reform
more realistic than it might initially appear.
Ultimately, the FOS is a product of a unique British history and
culture. For that reason, its success may not be easily replicated in the
United States. For instance, it may be that the FOS's origin as a
voluntary scheme among insurers imbued it with a credibility that is
entirely path dependent and cannot be replicated here. But the sheer
scope of the FOS's success-both across all consumer financial
services in the United Kingdom and across geographic regions ranging
from Japan to India and much of Europe-minimizes these objections.
At the very least, it provides a sufficient case for state experimentation
with an American private insurance ombudsman modeled on the FOS.
Such experimentation is itself an important element of effective
424. See Gilad, supm note 179, at 228-29, 238-41. Complaint handlers accomplish
this not only by focusing on their independence but also by making written communications
clear, grammatically correct, and informal and friendly, as well as reflecting an understanding
of the basis for the complaint. Secid at 233,235,238.
425. See genemllyTyldesley & Paruk, supa note 9 (reviewing the history of the initial
insurance ombudsman bureau).
426. Seeid
427. Another option is that lawmakers could require insurers who reject the
recommendations of complaint handlers to (1) fund a set amount of attorneys' fees upfront in
such cases and/or (2) provide subsistence payments to policyholders during the course of any
such litigation.
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dispute system design, and should be conducted with an eye towards
"testing and evaluating the design to make appropriate revisions."428
If a private ombudsman scheme were successful in the insurance
realm, the implications would be significant for all consumer financial
services. As in the United Kingdom, the private ombudsman model
could evolve well beyond insurance, representing a new method for
resolving virtually any consumer financial dispute. Indeed, as in
insurance, the basic infrastructure for a private ombudsman scheme
already exists in the banking and securities realms. The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency has a Customer Assistance Group that
largely mirrors state insurance regulators in terms of the complaint
conciliation services it provides.4 9  The Securities & Exchange
Commission similarly provides limited consumer complaint services
to investors via its Office of Investor Education and Advocacy.3°
Many of the lessons that the FOS offers for insurance may therefore be
applicable to a wide range of consumer financial disputes.
428. Franck, supra note 13, at 178 (summarizing the basic process of dispute system
design, and listing such experimentation as the fourth, and final, stage of effective dispute
system design).
429. See Contact OCC's Customer Assistance Group, http://www.helpwithmybank.
gov/contactus/index.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2008). Interestingly, the Customer Assistance
Group is actually a subdivision of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
ombudsman. The ombudsman was initially a traditional ombudsman's office that was
primarily tasked with dealing with bankers' complaints about the OCC itself. See OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, REPORT OF THE OMBUDSMAN 2005-2006, at 7-27
(2007), available athttp://www.occ.gov/Ombudsman/2006OmbudsmanReport.pdf.
430. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, How the SEC Handles Your Complaint,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/howoiea.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
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